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ABSTRACT
“Big Data” is big business. Data brokers profit by tracking 
consumers’ information and behavior both on- and offline and using 
this collected data to assign consumers evaluative scores and 
classify consumers into segments. Companies then use these 
consumer scores and segmentations for marketing and to determine 
what deals, offers, and remedies they provide to different individuals. 
These valuations and classifications are based on not only 
consumers’ financial histories and relevant interests, but also their 
race, gender, ZIP Code, social status, education, familial ties, and a 
wide range of additional data. Nonetheless, consumers are largely 
unaware of these scores and segmentations, and generally have no 
way to challenge their veracity because they usually fall outside the 
purview of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Moreover, 
companies’ use of these data devices may foster discrimination and 
augment preexisting power imbalances among consumers by 
funneling the best deals and remedies to the wealthiest and most 
sophisticated consumers. Use of these scores and segmentations 
increases the growing gap between powerful “haves” and 
vulnerable “have-nots.” This Article sheds light on these data 
devices and aims to spark adoption of data privacy regulations that 
protect all consumers regardless of their educational, economic, 
ethnic, or social status.
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INTRODUCTION
Data brokers collect and sell information about consumers to 
companies for marketing and other purposes. This is not a surprise to 
most consumers. The media is filled with stories about “Big Data”
and rising concerns with online privacy. What may be surprising to 
many, however, is the breadth and depth of data collection and the 
secret ways companies use this information to categorize, evaluate, 
and essentially discriminate among consumers.1 Data brokers gather 
1. See EDITH RAMIREZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A
CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY i-ix (2014), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-
accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.
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not only consumers’ spending and debt histories, but also much more 
intimate details of consumers’ financial, social, and personal lives.
They track where consumers shop, what they shop for, how they pay 
for purchases, and much more. Some data brokers even make 
assumptions about consumers based on whether they use a pen or 
pencil to fill out forms.2
Data sharing and aggregation also have reached unimaginable 
levels. Data brokers share and sell information among themselves
through a complex web of relationships to create individual and 
group-based consumer files. These files include a vast array of data 
points from online and offline sources. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) found in its 2014 study of the largest data 
brokers that one broker had “information on 1.4 billion consumer 
transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements,” and 
another broker “adds three billion new records each month to its 
databases.”3 Furthermore, one of the studied brokers “has 3000 data 
segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.”4
Data brokers use this mammoth amount of information to 
predict consumer behavior and propensities. They make assumptions 
and inferences based on the information collected to classify 
consumers into segments for positive and negative marketing 
campaigns. For example, brokers have generated marketing lists for 
pet stores based on consumers’ dog product purchasing histories, in 
an effort to help these stores target those who would likely want their 
products.5 However, brokers also have used collected data indicating 
low income combined with Latino or African-American descent to 
classify consumers into segments under seemingly innocuous labels 
such as “Urban Scramble” and “Mobile Mixers,” possibly fueling
exploitative marketing to these individuals.6
pdf?utm_source=govdelivery; see also Katy Bachman, Consumer Scores Are the 
Next Privacy Boogeyman in Washington: Report Details ‘Hundreds of Secret 
Consumer Scores,’ ADWEEK (Apr. 3, 2014, 12:47 PM), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/consumer-scores-are-next-privacy-
boogeyman-washington-156753 (emphasizing the secret nature of these consumer 
scores with power to determine our financial futures in today’s market).
2. See Nathalie Martin, Hey Dude, What’s Your E-score, CREDIT SLIPS 
(Aug. 20, 2012, 1:02 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/08/hey-dude-
whats-your-e-score.html.
3. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at iv, 46-47 (encapsulating the FTC’s 
findings).
4. Id. at iv, 47.
5. See id. at 47.
6. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In addition, some data brokers go beyond consumer 
segmentation to create logarithmic consumer “scores” or ratings that 
they sell to companies for marketing and other purposes.7 Companies 
use these predictive segmentations and scores to assess each 
consumer’s likely value to the company and to decide what offers 
and remedies each consumer deserves in the company’s assessment.8
A consumer’s score may thus inform how a company will treat that 
individual when he or she calls customer service or asks about the
company’s products and services.9
Consumer segmentations and scores therefore have powerful 
impacts.10 Companies may use such predictive data devices to
discriminate against consumers they deem less valuable or too risky.
A New York Times reporter observed:
A growing number of companies, including banks, credit and debit card 
providers, insurers and online educational institutions are using these 
scores to choose whom to woo on the Web. These scores can determine 
whether someone is pitched a platinum credit card or a plain one, a full-
service cable plan or none at all. They can determine whether a customer 
is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or relegated to an overflow 
call center.11
Despite this power, these scores are largely secret and 
impossible to decipher without an in-depth understanding of data 
analytics.12 Businesses guard information about consumer scores as 
7. PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, THE SCORING OF AMERICA: HOW
SECRET CONSUMER SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE 6-10 
(2014), available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_April2014_fs.pdf.
8. See id. at 19-20 (discussing the different uses of consumer scores).
9. Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers’ Buying Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-
scores-rank-consumers-by-potential-value.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
10. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules 
and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1440 (2014) (“Big Data can 
be used to predict future behavior because the process of studying an individual’s 
purchases, online searches, borrowing activity, and social network composition 
reveals aspects of that individual’s personality and preferences.”). 
11. Singer, supra note 9.
12. See Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers Not Lists: The 
New World of Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 845, 855-67 (2013). Professor Nathalie Martin 
commented that “[t]he e-score process is entirely nontransparent and obviously not 
regulated.” Martin, supra note 2.
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proprietary trade secrets.13 They also generally have no legal duty to 
comply with credit reporting rules with respect to these ratings and 
scores because they are not used for determining credit, insurance, or 
employment per se.14 Instead, companies assert that they use these 
predictive valuations and classifications for marketing, which is 
merely benign business in our capitalist economy.15
Use of consumer data also seems fair to the extent that it 
rewards consumers for positive purchasing and payment histories,
and funnels offers to consumers to suit their interests. It also may 
allow companies to save money by targeting their marketing and 
retention efforts. They theoretically can then pass on their cost 
savings to consumers through lower prices and higher quality goods 
and services. At the same time, companies may seek only the 
customers they deem most lucrative. Furthermore, “price 
discrimination, in the sense of price differences unsupported by cost 
differences,” is common.16
Nonetheless, price differentials based on consumer ratings 
perpetuate cycles of poverty.17 They augment power imbalances 
between the economically and socially powerful “haves” and the 
disempowered “have-nots.”18 For example, consumers with more
education and higher income, and those who live in prestigious 
neighborhoods, are likely to have more favorable consumer scores or 
profiles—and thus obtain better offers, deals, and overall treatment.19
Consumers also may receive special remedies because they have 
13. Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An 
Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial 
Models Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 117-18 (2011).
14. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) (2012) (indicating 
the narrow parameters of the Act, which do not extend to general data collection and 
reporting for marketing purposes).
15. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 20 (“In new consumer scoring, 
some have argued that the scores are mainly just for marketing and are largely 
beneficial.”).
16. Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8 (2002).
17. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: 
The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 672-76 (1996) (discussing how sellers differentiate among 
buyers by providing contract changes and adjustments to only the most sophisticated 
consumers who complain).
18. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the 
Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279 (2012).
19. See Nate Cullerton, Note, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 101 GEO. L.J.
807, 820-24 (discussing the discriminatory dynamics regarding data collection).
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higher social capital based on their propensity to post on social 
media and gather followers and friends online.20 Meanwhile, less 
powerful or socially savvy consumers may miss out on these deals 
and perks.21 Moreover, scores and segmentations that factor in race, 
gender, and other suspect considerations may foster discrimination.22
At the same time, lack of transparency regarding consumer 
scores and segmentations stymies proper market regulation. It 
prevents economists’ theoretical “informed minority” from learning 
about or notifying others of unfair practices and threatening to go 
elsewhere if companies do not make appropriate changes.23 First, 
there is no evidence that a sufficient number of “informed”
consumers know their rights or read privacy policies, especially 
when the terms may not be easily accessible or easy to understand.24
Furthermore, even if some “informed minority” exists, only a 
handful of these consumers contest use of their information or seek 
better deals.25 In addition, individuals who receive better deals have 
little to no incentive to share information about rationed benefits 
20. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
21. See Schmitz, supra note 18, at 296-300.
22. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 808 (discussing the heightened potential 
of discrimination facilitated by data collection).
23. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
630, 637-39 (1979) (“Thus, if enough searchers exist, firms have incentives both to 
compete for their business and to offer the same terms to nonsearchers. When the 
preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the preferences of 
nonsearchers, competition among firms for searchers should tend to protect all 
consumers.”).
24. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 17, at 664-76 (concluding that the 
informed minority argument is based on faulty assumptions); Yannis Bakos, 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? 
Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts 1-26 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256 (studying the Internet browsing of 48,154 
households and finding that only one or two in 1,000 shoppers studied online 
software merchants or accessed their websites). Even proactive shoppers usually 
focus on only price and a few other terms particular to their needs. LARRY A.
DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND 
INTERPRETATION 29 (2007).
25. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 17, at 647-50 (explaining and 
questioning the informed minority argument); Lee Goldman, My Way and the 
Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form 
Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 714-16 (1992) (explaining the informed minority
argument through a discussion of the “marginal set of informed consumers”).
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with the uninformed masses.26 Businesses then continue to 
manipulate contract terms and hide use of consumer data under the 
guise of “marketing” and proprietary business practices beyond the 
scope of credit reporting rules.27
Additionally, the lack of personal relations and shared contract 
understandings in Business-to-Consumer (B2C) exchanges augment 
concerns with consumer scoring and segmentation.28 Companies 
often have no basis besides data brokers’ predictions to decipher 
which consumers they should seek or retain. Scores and segments 
based on economic and noneconomic factors create easy rubrics for 
discriminating among consumers, while lack of transparency denies 
consumers the opportunity to challenge the veracity of these 
valuations or alert others to risks associated with these assessments.
Meanwhile, data brokers become more and more sophisticated in 
uncovering and manipulating consumers’ behavioral propensities.29
In summary, this creates a strong need for consumer protections that 
a broken market has failed to provide.
The FTC highlighted these concerns regarding Big Data’s
collection and use of consumer data in its May 2014 report, and has 
urged Congress to take action to protect consumers’ data privacy.30
The FTC and the White House have urged data brokers to provide 
consumers with clear notice and increased choice with respect to 
collection and use of personal data.31 Some commentators and 
policymakers also have proposed that the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), which is applicable to data reports used for credit, 
insurance, and employment determinations, should be extended to 
26. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too 
Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 879, 895-97 (2008) (discussing how businesses may 
discriminate in favor of sophisticated consumers by reducing fees and foregoing 
enforcement of terms in their form agreements that are otherwise “prejudicial to 
customer interests”).
27. See infra notes 89, 98 and accompanying text.
28. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 
1003-04 (2014).
29. See id.
30. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
31. Alexei Alexis, Big Data Report to Obama Urges Reforms on Breach 
Notice, ECPA, Consumer Rights, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/big-data-report-n17179890156/ (urging advancement of the 
Obama administration’s proposed privacy “bill of rights” and data security breach 
notification legislation); RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 46-57 (recommending 
legislation and policies to increase consumers’ access to information about data 
collected and to opt out of allowing for use of their data).
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cover consumer scoring more generally.32 However, the FCRA has 
not been entirely effective, and it is uncertain whether and how it 
should apply to other consumer scores.33
Accordingly, this Article seeks to shed light on consumer 
scores and segmentations, and present suggestions for regulating 
these data devices with an eye toward maximizing their benefits and 
minimizing their drawbacks and dangers. Indeed, the time is ripe for 
such regulation, as the FTC is examining the effects of Big Data on 
low income and underserved consumers.34 Furthermore, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank), has voiced concern regarding consumer privacy with respect 
to financial products and services.35
Part I of this Article depicts the depth and breadth of data 
collection and the use of this data to score and classify consumers for 
marketing and other purposes. Part II then discusses the current laws 
and regulations that may apply to data collection, as well as rules 
restricting data reporting with respect to mainly credit, insurance,
and employment decisions. In light of the current laws’ limitations, 
Part III considers the FTC’s and others’ proposals for regulations and 
reforms aimed to protect consumers from the dangers of rampant 
data collection, scoring, and segmentation. It also highlights the 
promise and pitfalls of these proposals and provides suggestions for 
balanced reforms that address how such data practices contribute to 
the growing gap between consumer “haves” and “have-nots.” The 
Article concludes by inviting policymakers, businesses, and 
consumer groups to consider these and other ideas for imposing just 
and cost-effective restrictions on Big Data.
32. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012).
33. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014).
34. FTC to Examine Effects of Big Data on Low Income and Underserved 
Consumers at September Workshop, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-examine-effects-big-
data-low-income-underserved-consumers (announcing the September 2014 
workshop to explore these issues).
35. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank]; David Cho & 
Michael D. Shear, White House Issues Detailed Proposal for Consumer-Finance 
Watchdog, WASH. POST (July 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063004187.html.
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I. CONSUMER SCORES AND SEGMENTATIONS IN THE EXPANDING 
WORLD OF BIG DATA
Data collection has expanded exponentially with the growth of 
the Internet and online contracting, and data brokers have banked on 
that growth in selling consumers’ information. Furthermore, brokers 
have plugged that data into highly technical algorithms to create 
consumer classifications and scores or ratings that companies then 
use to determine how they will treat consumers in the marketplace.
Such assessments based on collected data and inferences may benefit 
companies and consumers when they enhance products and services,
and open doors to positive innovations. However, such expansion of 
Big Data has become problematic due to its clandestine nature and 
discriminatory effects.36
A. Expanding Data-Broker Industry
Data collection is not new. The United States Census Bureau 
has been gathering data since the first census in 1790.37 Since that 
time, however, privacy concerns have risen exponentially as not only 
the government, but also private companies and data brokers gather 
information about consumers from both online and offline sources.38
The news is filled with stories of data breaches and identity theft.
This has created growing angst among consumers in the online 
marketplace, with 92% of U.S. Internet users worrying about their 
online privacy.39
Nonetheless, consumers are not fully aware of the depth and 
breadth of data collection and online tracking by private companies 
operating outside of the public eye. Only 47% of respondents in that 
36. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 808. Notably, lack of consumer privacy 
protections in the United States also has had significant impacts on national and 
economic security. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER
PRIVACY, AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY (2014) (providing written remarks for the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee 
on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade). This reinforces the need for better 
consumer privacy protections in the United States and should hasten policymakers’ 
efforts in that regard.
37. Agency History, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/
www/census_then_now/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
38. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
39. See TRUSTE, TRUSTE 2014 US CONSUMER CONFIDENCE PRIVACY 
REPORT: CONSUMER OPINION AND BUSINESS IMPACT 3 (2014), available at
http://download.truste.com/dload.php/?f=4HKV87KT-447.
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same survey of Internet users said they were concerned with 
companies tracking their behavior online.40 In reality, however, all 
consumers have good reason to be very concerned with the expanse 
of Big Data and its tracking tirade. As noted above, the FTC found 
that data brokers gather information on billions of transactions and 
aggregate hundreds of billions of data elements to create consumer 
profiles.41
Search engines like Google, Yahoo, and Bing are notorious for 
collecting consumers’ data.42 EBay, Amazon, ESPN, Disney (which 
owns ABC), MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are just a 
handful of the companies that eagerly collect their patrons’ data and 
searching habits.43 Furthermore, companies such as IBM, which were 
once associated with computer products and software, have moved 
into the data industry, viewing data as “the world’s new natural 
resource.”44 Consumers should expect that Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs), search engines, merchants, and other data brokers are
tracking their every move online.45
This increase in “who” collects data pales in comparison to the 
mammoth expansion in “what” data companies collect about 
consumers. Data collectors track consumers when they make online 
purchases, use store loyalty cards, and pay for goods or services 
using their credit and debit cards.46 They also track spending habits, 
how long one lingers on a website, consumers’ online searching 
histories, family information, and even postings on social sites such 
as Facebook.47 “Consumer data companies are scooping up huge 
40. Id. at 3-6. Nonetheless, concerns about tracking have escalated among 
those aged 55-64, and is higher among married than single persons. Id. at 7.
41. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 46-47.
42. See Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 847.
43. Joseph Conlin, The New Media and Marketing Landscape, at *7 (Jan. 
29, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140815012524/http://www1bpt.bridgeport
.edu/~jconlin/InternetMarketing.pdf.
44. IBM, WHAT WILL WE MAKE OF THIS MOMENT? 2013 IBM ANNUAL 
REPORT 13-15 (2013), available at http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/2013/bin/
assets/2013_ibm_annual.pdf (focusing strategy on transforming IBM’s place in Big 
Data for prediction and prescription based on collected and aggregated data).
45. See Online Information Brokers and Your Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 1, 2004), https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ar/infobrokers.
htm.
46. See What Information Do Data Brokers Have On Consumers, and How 
Do They Use It: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th 
Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection of the Federal Trade Commission).
47. See Conlin, supra note 43.
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amounts of consumer information” and “selling it, providing 
marketers details about whether you’re pregnant or divorced or 
trying to lose weight, about how rich you are and what kinds of cars 
you drive.”48
Data brokers also augment information with data from one’s
ISP, device-tracking software, facial recognition software, and 
programs like Google AdSense in order to build consumer profiles.49
This may include information about consumers’ use of particular 
browsers, propensity to click on certain ads, phone numbers, email 
address, location, IP address, and much more.50 Data brokers also 
have become especially vigilant in tracking consumers’ third-party 
and social connections online. Indeed, data collection and 
aggregation transpires through an unimaginable labyrinth of 
information sharing among merchants and data brokers.51
“Cookies” may not be so sweet to consumers. Cookies,
embedded in almost all websites, track consumers while navigating a 
website, and may follow the consumer’s activity to gather further 
information as he or she visits other websites.52 These cookies are 
usually stealth. However, one can see what bluekai.com, for 
example, has gathered from some cookies by visiting 
http://www.bluekai.com/registry.53 Such rare disclosures are 
somewhat refreshing, but equally alarming for many consumers.54
Researchers at the University of California, Berkeley compared 
top websites’ cookies and other tracking technologies from 2009 to 
2011 with tracking technologies in 2013 and found that “the number 
48. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know 
About You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/everything-we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
49. Bono, ‘Reclaim Your Name:’ Find Out What Big Data Companies 
Know About You, SKYTECHGEEK (Aug. 2, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/201407
02075145/http://skytechgeek.com/2013/08/big-data-companies-know-about-you/.
50. Id.; see also, Laura J. Bowman, Note, Pulling Back the Curtain: Online 
Consumer Tracking, 7 ISJLP 721, 727, 733-36, 748-49 (2012).
51. See generally Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Consumer Legal 
Protections Against the Layers of Big Data (unpublished manuscript) (2014 TPRC 
Conference Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2418805##.
52. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 29-30 (discussing the use of 
cookies).
53. The Bluekai Registry—Putting Consumers in Control of Their Digital 
Footprint, ORACLE: BLUEKAI, http://www.bluekai.com/registry/ (last visited Jan. 7, 
2015).
54. It caused quite a stir when I had students in one of my classes check 
their names on this site.
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of tracking cookies expanded dramatically[,] and . . . advertisers had 
developed new, previously unobserved tracking mechanisms that 
users cannot avoid even with the strongest privacy settings.”55 They 
found that 100% of the top websites now use tracking software and 
that third-party tracking companies and advertisers, instead of first-
party sites, now place most cookies without consumers’ approval or 
awareness.56
Tracking can be quite extensive. For example, Bloomberg 
News reporters gained access to every aspect of users’ research 
information on the Bloomberg Terminal.57 The intricacies of the 
tracking allowed these reporters to track users’ every keystroke.58
One commentator likened this data collection through Bloomberg 
Terminal as a modern equivalent of the “memex” 1945 futuristic 
concept of a desktop technology that records trails of searches and 
other information for later users.59 The commentator also argued that 
so-called “[d]eidentification” of data as a safeguard for user privacy 
is largely ineffective because IP addresses and other identifying 
information can easily be reattached to ostensibly anonymous user 
data.60
While consumers may enjoy the personalized advertisements 
they receive due to tracking, they are often alarmed that they are 
unable to easily block data tracking.61 Many data brokers do not offer 
a method for opting out of data sharing.62 Moreover, consumers 
unknowingly may consent to share data with layers of data collectors 
55. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You 
Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 273, 273 (2012). A Wall Street Journal
article found that the “nation’s 50 top websites on average installed 64 pieces of 
tracking technology onto the computers of visitors, usually with no warning.” Julia 
Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at 
W1.
56. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 276.
57. See James Grimmelmann, Big Data’s Other Privacy Problem 2-3
(Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey Sch. of Law, Paper No. 7, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358079.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id. at 6.
61. See id. at 2-5.
62. See Erica M. Scott, Note, Protecting Consumer Data While Allowing 
the Web to Develop Self-Sustaining Architecture: Is a Trans-Atlantic Browser-Based 
Opt-In for Behavioral Tracking the Right Solution?, 1 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L. J. 285, 295-305 (2014); Julia Angwin, Privacy Tools: Opting Out 
from Data Brokers, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 30, 2014, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/privacy-tools-opting-out-from-data-brokers.
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by failing to opt out of data collection and sharing with one 
company.63 The FTC found that because data brokers are usually not 
consumer-facing, it is confusing or nearly impossible for consumers 
to opt out of data collection and sharing even when data brokers 
ostensibly provide that option.64 Furthermore, even the sophisticated 
and informed minority of consumers that learn about and access 
brokers’ websites that do allow for opting out may not realize the 
limitations of those opt-outs or that doing so with one company will 
not protect against other companies’ data mining.65
Consumers also are slow to block cookies when searching the 
web because companies often state that site features are not available 
without cookies enabled.66 Advertisers have agreed “in principle to a 
universal ‘Do Not Track’ mechanism,” but that does not preclude 
third parties including Google, Facebook, and others from continuing 
to gather data via cookies and other tracking mechanisms.67 In 
addition, removed information “may be re-posted . . . at a later date 
when [a] company downloads a new batch of information.”68 Robust 
tracking mechanisms such as “Flash cookies” also gather 
increasingly more information and can reinstate themselves after
being deleted.69
Furthermore, data collectors and merchants benefit by offering 
“free” online services.70 The problem is that “free” is not truly free.71
For example, some websites provide consumers with “free” rate
calculators and other online tools to gather quotes and information 
63. Bagley & Brown, supra note 51, at 33-40.
64. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
65. Id. at 49, 53 (noting that many data brokers do not provide consumers 
with access to their data with respect to risk mitigation products offered to help 
companies verify identity).
66. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 290 (discussing how Hulu 
requires users to accept cookies to access certain services).
67. Id. at 275-76.
68. Online Information Brokers and Your Privacy, supra note 45 (stating 
further tips and information regarding data broker issues).
69. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 282. Similarly, technologies that 
write files to users’ computers (Etags, Flash cookies, HTML5 local storage, and 
Evercookies) are also difficult to block and delete because they can reinstate 
themselves. Id. at 281-85. There are also technologies that rely on attributes of 
users’ computers (i.e., using an aggregate of features such as browser type, plug-ins, 
and font) as a “fingerprint” to remotely track users’ Internet usage based on what 
their computers do. Id.
70. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs 
of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 608 (2014).
71. Id. at 609.
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for products such as mortgages, college loans, or insurance.72 These 
fill-in-the-form search widgets assist consumers in their budgeting 
and in obtaining services ranging from finding home contractors to 
choosing car insurance and applying for online degrees.73 Consumers 
seeking the information and assistance willingly divulge vast 
amounts of personal, financial, and even health information. Data 
brokers then use and sell this information gathered through these 
widgets.74
Data brokers also collect and share data from location-tracking 
services. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied in-
car location services at the end of 2013 in an effort to understand the 
breadth and depth of the data issues associated with these services.75
It asked ten companies that offer these location-based services 
regarding their use of collected data and associated policies.76 It 
found that all of these companies collect location data, and nine of 
the ten share that data with third parties for the purpose of providing 
services to consumers.77 Nonetheless, all of the companies said that 
they do not share or sell personally identifiable information or 
location data with data brokers, and they aim to comply with best 
practices such as disclosing their use of data to their customers.78
However, the GAO also found that the companies’ disclosures were 
often misleading, did not give consumers power to delete or 
safeguard their data, and failed to provide information on how the 
companies hold themselves and their employees accountable.79
Again, consumers may enjoy the benefits of widgets and the 
personalized advertisements that companies generate based on 
gathered information. However, data aggregation and sharing is deep 
and vast. This data includes information from various public records, 
online tracking, and monitoring in the physical world. Real estate, 
criminal, bankruptcy, and any other public records are all fair game 
for data collectors. Consumers’ age, address, family data, ethnicity, 
72. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 856.
73. Id.
74. Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 70, at 633.
75. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-81, IN-CAR LOCATION-
BASED SERVICES: COMPANIES ARE TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT PRIVACY, BUT SOME 
RISKS MAY NOT BE CLEAR TO CONSUMERS (2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-81.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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employment, and medical information also are easily accessible.80
Data brokers also gather information through consumers’ use of store 
loyalty cards and coupons, as well as entries to seemingly benign 
contests and raffles.81 One company even adds its assumption that 
those who fill out forms using a pen instead of a pencil are more 
likely to pay their bills on time.82 Moreover, downstream data 
aggregation makes it nearly impossible for consumers to determine 
where or how a particular company has obtained their data.83
Accordingly, data brokers’ business model is essentially to 
gather as much information as possible and sell it to the highest 
bidders.84 They use this data to create consumer profiles that inform 
how companies treat consumers in the marketplace.85 Consumers are 
nonetheless unaware of this data collection and unable to verify the 
data’s accuracy.86 Inaccurate data and assumptions may then lead 
companies to offer consumers less or more advantageous deals than 
warranted.87 Moreover, algorithmic determinations may incorporate 
discriminatory assumptions and perpetuate problematic stereotypes 
that hinder consumers seeking to overcome social and economic 
barriers.88
B. Secret Scoring and Segmentations of Consumers’ Value
Boundaries have blurred between data collection and consumer 
scoring or valuation. Data brokers profit by selling leads and using 
80. See Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly 
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (June 12, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-charges-company-allegedly-
marketed.
81. See What Information Do Data Brokers Have On Consumers, and How 
Do They Use It, supra note 46, at 9.
82. Martin, supra note 2 (stating that a founder of a leading e-score 
company “learned working at Fingerhut how to sniff out a good paying customer, 
concluding . . . that people who filled out forms in pen were better payers than those 
who used pencils and people who used a middle initial paid more often that [sic] 
those who did not”).
83. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C, C-7 (providing statements of 
Commissioner Julie Brill).
84. Angwin, supra note 55, at W1. 
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See id.; Howard Baldwin, Big Data’s Big Impact Across Industries,
FORBES (Mar. 28, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardbaldwin/
2014/03/28/big-datas-big-impact-across-industries/.
88. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 820-24.
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gathered data to differentiate among consumers. For example, 
Bankrate.com gathers data and generates leads that it sells to 
companies to enhance their marketing strategies.89 Bankrate hosts a
consumer-friendly website with rate calculators and other tools that 
prompt individuals to provide a wide array of personal and financial 
information in order to obtain loan- and insurance-rate quotes.90 As 
noted above, such ostensibly “free” widgets can assist consumers in 
creating budgets and planning finances. As Bankrate.com boasts on 
its site, it is “the Web’s leading aggregator of financial rate 
information” and “provides free rate information to consumers on 
more than 300 financial products” with the help of its staff of 
reporters and experts.91 It also notes that it works with a network and 
co-branded sites to “provide the tools and information via a suite of 
products and services that can help consumers make better informed 
financial decisions.”92
Despite the consumer-friendly nature of Bankrate.com, the site 
does not make it clear to consumers that it profits from collecting 
website visitors’ personal contact information, device details, ISP 
data, and location.93 Although Bankrate’s privacy policy reveals that 
the company may transmit data collected about consumers to third 
parties, it does not explain that it also may sell the data for fees 
ranging from $8 for an insurance prospect and $35 for a finance lead 
to $75 for a mortgage prospect.94 Researchers found that in 2011, for 
example, Bankrate.com sold 18 million leads to 20,000 agents and 
75 carriers at considerable profits.95 Bankrate.com also works with 
major, but little known, online scoring companies TARGUSinfo and 
eBureau to determine more precisely what it predicts as consumers’
value to particular businesses.96
Bankrate.com is not alone in profiting from data collection and 
lead generation. Experian, for example, has branched well beyond 
89. Singer, supra note 9; see also About Bankrate, BANKRATE,
http://www.bankrate.com/coinfo/default.asp (highlighting that the site seeks to 
benefit consumers and not discussing the lead generation aspects beyond mention of 
“partners”) (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
90. About Bankrate, supra note 89.
91. Id. 
92. Id.
93. Privacy Policy, BANKRATE, http://www.bankrate.com/coinfo/privacy.
asp (last updated Sept. 17, 2014).
94. Singer, supra note 9; see also Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 
852 n.26.
95. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 857.
96. Id.
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traditional credit reporting to sell leads.97 Experian even sells lists of 
expectant parents and families with babies, who companies then 
target for marketing certain products.98 Similarly, these data brokers 
may aggregate consumers’ information from various sources and 
plug a wide variety of information into data-driven calculations and 
predictive models.99 These decisional models theoretically seek to 
account for a holistic view of each customer in crafting scores and/or 
ratings that companies use to differentiate among consumers.100
Consumer scoring therefore takes data collection and lead 
generation to the next level by using complicated mathematics, 
statistical modeling, and algorithms to crystallize many factors into 
numbers companies may use for marketing, predicting future 
behavior, assessing risks, and essentially determining how they treat 
different consumers.101 Consumer scoring companies employ 
actuaries and math wizards to essentially boil down a vast amount of 
data into scores or ratings that aim to predict an individual 
consumer’s likely value as a customer.102 These formulas and 
equations nonetheless remain a mystery to consumers because they 
are generally considered proprietary and shielded by trade secret 
law.103
EBureau is a leader in the consumer scoring industry.104 This 
company markets “eScores” as “a service that enables rapid 
development and deployment of customized statistical scores” that 
enable companies to optimize marketing, accounts receivable 
management, and other important interactions with consumers.105 It 
bases its scores on a “massive data warehouse” that includes 
consumer credit data, real property and asset records, household 
demographics, various files containing name, address, telephone and 
97. Beckett, supra note 48.
98. See id.
99. Bagley & Brown, supra note 51, at 6.
100. DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 8.
101. Id. at 6-10.
102. Id. at 27-28.
103. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 13, at 117-18. It is impossible for consumers 
to learn about or understand exactly what goes into their credit scores or whether 
they are statistically correct due to complicated algorithms. Id. Moreover, not even 
the government is able to pierce trade secrets law to test the algorithms’ accuracy or 
validity. Id.
104. About eBureau, EBUREAU, http://www.ebureau.com (last visited Jan. 7, 
2015).
105. EBUREAU, ESCORES DATA SHEET, available at
http://www.ebureau.com/sites/all/files/file/datasheets/ebureau_escore_datasheet.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
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date of birth information, Internet and other purchase histories, 
bankruptcy filings, and other public documents.106 It also may 
include behavioral assumptions in the mix of factors contributing to 
eScores.
EBureau’s algorithms remain secret, but it does reveal that it 
adds several thousand details from its data warehouse to the data sets 
that clients submit from their current marketing lists.107 EBureau then 
extrapolates common factors among these existing customer bases 
and uses that data to create complicated algorithms to determine 
prospective consumer eScores.108 These scores range from zero to 
ninety-nine, with ninety-nine indicating the best and zero indicating 
the worst likely return on a company’s investment.109 EBureau 
highlights low scores as especially important in culling would-be 
customers.110 In online education, for instance, schools use scores to 
winnow prospective students as not worth the investment of course 
catalogs or follow-up calls.111
In addition to eScores, eBureau also offers the following:
eTarget Demographics, a real-time consumer demographic data append 
service that helps B2C online marketers to instantly gain a comprehensive 
perspective of their opt-in Website visitor; Income Estimator, a model-
driven information append service that helps consumer-facing companies 
to estimate a person’s income; and eLink, a service that helps accounts 
receivable management firms and departments locate, update, and append 
information to a debtor record.112
Essentially, eBureau not only gathers data, but also adds information 
from various sources to consumers’ files and makes predictions that 
companies use in a wide variety of ways.
Data brokers like eBureau may provide companies with 
efficient marketing and workflow devices by helping them to best
allocate marketing resources. However, the data and assumptions at 
the foundation of consumer scores may not be accurate. The FTC 
found in its study that although data brokers usually take some steps 
to check accuracy of data collected, data quality varies greatly 
106. Id.
107. Singer, supra note 9.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Company Overview of eBureau, LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=2
7128128 (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
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among data brokers and products.113 Competition in the data industry 
pushes brokers to improve accuracy, but errors nonetheless persist 
due to data gap-filling and downstream aggregation.114 It is like the 
child’s game of “telephone” in which the first child whispers a secret 
in the ear of the nearest player and the players seek to repeat the 
secret ear-to-ear until the last player must reveal what she heard—
which has usually changed significantly by the time it has reached 
the last child’s ears.115
Furthermore, the lack of transparency and inability to contest 
collected data and related assumptions are concerning. Consumers 
may be upset to learn that a company offers them different deals and 
levels of care based on predictive scores. Neustar, for example, 
instantly scores consumers when they call a client company’s
customer service center to alert agents what to offer that caller.116 As 
another example, Wayfair.com may offer consumers different deals 
based on whether its algorithms classify the consumers as “hunters”
or “gatherers” when searching this online-sellers’ website.117
Consumer scoring is rampant and increasingly nuanced as 
individuals become subject to dozens or hundreds of secret consumer 
scores.118 The following are among the long list of scores highlighted 
by a recent report of the World Privacy Forum (WPF—a non-profit 
public interest research and consumer education group):
x Experian’s ChoiceScore for financial risk;
x Experian’s Median Equivalency Score for seriously 
derogatory behavior;
113. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 36-38.
114. Id.
115. This was a common party game when I was a child (long before video 
games and iPads!). It was always surprising how the secret changed when whispered 
from ear-to-ear despite each child’s earnest attempt to simply repeat the secret. 
Gossip is very similar in the sense that information changes the further it gets from 
the original source.
116. Neustar PlatformOne, NEUSTAR, http://www.neustar.biz/marketing-
solutions (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
117. Abram Brown, How Wayfair Sells Nearly $1 Billion Worth of Sofas, 
Patio Chairs and Cat Playgrounds, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2014/04/16/how-wayfair-sells-nearly-1-
billion-worth-of-sofas-patio-chairs-and-cat-playgrounds/print/ (emphasizing how the 
company has flourished using its algorithms and tracking consumers’ buying 
habits). “Hunters” are customers who indicate a propensity to search for and buy a 
particular item after price comparisons; such customers receive special deals as a 
means to capture their business while “gatherers,” who indicate a willingness to 
“window-shop,” do not receive these deals. Id.
118. See generally DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7.
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x Consumer Profitability Score to target profitable households;
x Job Security Score;
x Acxiom’s Consumer Prominence Indicator Score for a 
consumer’s market activity;
x Equifax’s Discretionary Spending Index Score;
x Experian’s Veriscore for customer value potential;
x Churn Score to predict when a customer will move business 
to another merchant;
x Target’s Pregnancy Predictor Score;
x Klout Score using social media to track one’s number of
Followers;
x Employment Success Score predicting job success using 
Facebook data;
x Casino Gaming Propensity Score;
x Economic Stability Indicator.119
The WPF report also explains how some of these scores go 
beyond assessments based on an individual’s financial information to 
include consideration of that individual’s connections, networks, and 
“friends” on social media.120 Advertisers may reach out to a highly 
valued customer’s “friends” on Facebook to market goods and 
services presuming that the consumer’s friends will share 
characteristics they deem valuable for their business.121 However, a 
company also may downgrade a consumer’s value based on 
“friends” and connections deemed less worthy in the company’s
valuation.122 “Social credit” also considers consumers’ influence on 
social media more generally, including followers on Twitter and 
friends on Facebook.123 Consumers may even be judged based on the 
music they listen to on Spotify and Pandora.
The FTC also released a 2014 report describing how data 
brokers use complex models and algorithms to segment and score 
119. Id. at 42-79 (discussing all the different types of scores and including 
scoring well beyond what is noted here).
120. Id. at 72-76.
121. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 814-17 (discussing valuations based on 
social media connections).
122. See id. at 816.
123. Id. at 816-17.
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consumers.124 The FTC based its report on information the 
Commission gathered from nine of the largest data brokers in the 
United States.125 These brokers covered a cross section of the 
industry ranging from those that focus on products for marketing to 
those specializing in risk mitigation and people searches.126
Specifically, the FTC gathered details about the following: “The 
nature and sources of consumer information [the data brokers] 
collect. How the companies use, maintain, and distribute that 
information. If they allow consumers to see the information they 
collect, if consumers can correct inaccuracies or opt out of having 
their information sold.”127 In conducting its study, the FTC voiced its 
concerns for data privacy while also acknowledging how data 
collection and sharing benefit consumers and the economy by 
helping address fraud and allowing companies to better market their 
goods and services.128
124. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 19-39 (discussing these marketing 
products and the many categorizations companies use in determining consumer 
offers and treatment). The FTC gathered information by sending out Model Orders 
requiring the selected data brokers to produce information regarding the companies’ 
products and services, general data collection practice, complaint and inquiry record, 
policies regarding consumer access to the collected data, and a list of the company’s 
largest consumers. Id. at app. A. The orders also asked the brokers to provide a 
Special Report detailing a variety of information, including the nature and purpose 
of products and services that use personal data, methods of accuracy evaluation, 
transparency, consumer access to collected data, and consumers’ ability to correct or 
delete information collected. Id.
125. Janna Herron, FTC Takes on Data Brokers, BANKRATE (Dec. 19, 2012, 
4:00 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20131003065653/http://www.bankrate.com/
financing/credit-cards/ftc-takes-on-data-brokers/; see RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1,
at 9-10. 
126. See RAMIREZ ET AL, supra note 1, at i.
127. Id.; see FTC to Study Data Broker Industry’s Collection and Use of 
Consumer Data, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news
-events/press-releases/2012/12/ftc-study-data-broker-industrys-collection-use-
consumer-data; see also, e.g., Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., to 4Nannies 2 (May 2, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-warns-data-
broker-operations-possible-privacy-violations/130507databrokers4nanniesletter.pdf 
(“At this time, we have not evaluated your company’s practices to determine 
whether they comply with the FCRA. However, we encourage you to review your 
products and services, as well as your policies, employee-training, and other 
procedures for compliance.”). 
128. FTC to Study Data Broker Industry’s Collection and Use of Consumer 
Data, supra note 127.
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In May 2014, the FTC issued its report based on the 
information collected.129 It highlighted some benign classifications 
such as “Consumers Interested in Buying Camping Gear,” but also
revealed questionable segments based on combinations of age, 
ethnicity, and/or income such as: “Urban Scramble” and “Mobile 
Mixers” (“high concentration of Latino and African-American 
consumers with low incomes”), “Thrifty Elders” (singles in late 
60s/early 70s with low income), “Work & Causes” (lower-income 
consumers in late 40s/early 50s in multi-unit dwellings), “Timeless 
Traditions” (immigrants, many of retirement age with limited 
English and lower incomes), “Downtown Dwellers” (lower-income 
singles in metro areas with limited education and working clerical or 
service jobs to “make[] ends meet”), and “Metro Parents” (single
parents with limited education, living “urban life on a small 
budget”).130 Classifications also may take into account health 
conditions such as diabetes and high cholesterol, only to name a
few.131
The FTC also found that five of the nine brokers it studied 
provide analytic products “based on algorithms that consider 
hundreds or thousands of data elements,” and may be converted into 
a variety of scores for consumers.132 Scores may assess consumers’
likely response or purchase rates, influence and presence on the 
Internet, and purchasing power more generally.133 For example, 
companies use “social influence scores to ensure that they advertise 
their products to these particular consumers, with the expectation 
that these consumers will, in turn, tout these products to their friends 
and followers.”134
Such scoring and “social influence” assessments raise serious 
relational concerns by judging individuals based on their connections 
and essentially who they “hang out with” on social media.135
Furthermore, consumer scoring more generally has raised red flags 
for many government regulators and consumer advocates. Professor 
Frank Pasquale has studied the broker industry and highlighted how 
129. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at i-ii.
130. Id. at 19-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also listing more 
segments). 
131. Id. at 47. 
132. Id. at 31.
133. Id. at iii.
134. Id. at 31.
135. Cullerton, supra note 19, at 825-26. 
Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations 1433
these consumer scores perpetuate discriminatory contracting.136 He 
stated with respect to e-scores “‘I’m troubled by the idea that some 
people will essentially be seeing ads for subprime loans, vocational 
schools and payday loans . . . while others might be seeing ads for 
regular banks and colleges, and not know why.’”137
Mierzwinksi and Chester also have questioned whether these 
scores cross over the line from valid marketing or permissible data 
collection to credit reporting and assessment governed by the 
FCRA.138 Currently, the FCRA does not generally apply to broader 
consumer scores or ratings because it only applies to credit scores or 
reports used for credit, employment, or insurance determinations.139
Similarly, consumer scores usually fall outside the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA), which bars consideration of factors like 
race, gender, and marital status in extending credit.140 Those creating 
consumer scores also are generally not obligated to follow Fair 
Information Practices or provide due process to consumers.141
Concerns regarding this lack of regulation and transparency have 
spurred the FTC and the CFPB to study related issues.142
II. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON DATA BROKERS AND CREDIT SCORING
The law governing privacy and the data broker industry is far 
from clear. As the GAO has stated, “In relation to data used for 
marketing purposes, no federal statute provides consumers the right 
to learn what information is held about them and who holds it.”143
This Section therefore aims only to provide a brief sketch of the key 
regulations and potential restrictions on data brokers’ use of 
consumer information to create scores or valuations. Namely, the 
FTC regulates data privacy, and its chief enforcement tool is the 
FCRA governing credit reporting that impacts consumers’ access to 
136. Singer, supra note 9.
137. Id. (quoting Frank Pasquale). 
138. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 861-62.
139. DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 44.
140. Id. at 9-10.
141. Id. at 10 (summarizing problems associated with consumer scoring).
142. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 878-81 (calling for these 
agencies to study these issues and establish clear policy in light of the growing 
digital marketplace).
143. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-663, INFORMATION 
RESELLERS: CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE MARKETPLACE 16 (2013).
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credit, insurance, and employment.144 Nonetheless, this Act generally 
does not govern broad-based consumer scoring and ratings 
companies use for marketing and other consumer interactions.145 This 
leaves the area ripe for regulation by the FTC and/or CFPB.
A. FTC and the FCRA
The FCRA generally governs consumer reports and imposes 
duties upon consumer reporting agencies.146 The Act requires these 
agencies to provide consumers with all information in their credit 
files upon request, including information about payment histories 
and the identities of all those who received the reports.147 Consumers 
have a right to one free copy of their report from each reporting 
agency per year.148 They also may have a right to more than one free 
copy per year in some states.149 Furthermore, consumers may obtain 
a free copy of their credit file in various circumstances such as 
identity theft or when “[a] person has taken adverse action against 
you because of information in your credit file.”150 Upon consumer 
request, reporting agencies also must provide consumers with “[t]he 
dates, original payees, and amounts of any checks [written by the 
consumers] upon which [the agency] based any adverse 
characterization of the consumer[s]” in their reports.151
In addition, reporting agencies must supplement reports with a 
statement setting forth consumers’ FCRA rights.152 This statement 
notifies consumers that the reporting agencies must correct or delete 
inaccurate, incomplete, or unverifiable information generally within 
thirty days after one notifies the agency of the discrepancy.153
Consumers bear the burden, however, to do their due diligence in 
obtaining their credit reports, checking them for accuracy, and 
notifying the agency reporting the inaccurate information in writing 
144. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
145. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 860.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(b).
147. Id. § 1681g(a).
148. Id. § 1681j(a)(1)(A). 
149. See A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 
ACT, available at http://www.cheyney.edu/human-resources/documents/1-1-
2013Summary_of_Rights.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
150. Id.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(4).
152. 16 C.F.R. § 601.1(b) (2001).
153. Id. § 601 app. A.
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of any discrepancies.154 The FCRA does not require agencies to give 
consumers their scores free of charge, but they must disclose all the 
information in credit files.155 Furthermore, agencies have no duty to 
remove accurate information unless it is more than seven years old, 
or ten years old in the case of bankruptcies.156
Notably, these rules only apply to consumer reports as defined 
by the FCRA.157 Section 1681a(d)(1) of the FCRA defines a 
consumer report as:
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, 
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or 
collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in 
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for–
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.158
Under this definition, the FCRA generally applies to the 
traditional credit reports that most consumers have heard of or seen 
from companies like Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax.159 It also 
applies to reports created by lesser-known reporting agencies.160 One 
such powerful agency that remains largely unknown is Advanced 
Resolution Services, Inc., which is a subsidiary of Visa, Inc. that 
assists in evaluating risks related to credit cardholders’ accounts.161
154. One may go online to www.ftc.gov to obtain information on getting 
their annual free credit reports (one from each of the three main agencies—
Experian, Equifax, and Transunion). Get My Free Credit Report, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/get-my-free-credit-report 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015). Consumers also may call 1-877-FTC-HELP to file a 
complaint or to obtain free information about consumer issues. About Us, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 7, 
2015).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(f)(1). 
156. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 605(a), 84 Stat. 1128, 
1129-30 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
158. Id. § 1681a(d)(1). 
159. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 846.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
161. See Company Overview of Advanced Resolution Services, Inc.,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/
private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=108558215 (last visited Jan. 7, 2015). There is not a 
great deal of information on ARS available on the Internet or elsewhere. I learned 
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The FCRA generally does not apply to internal credit 
determinations that a company may make based on data it has 
collected from its own tracking or from parties other than credit 
reporting agencies.162 The Act also does not apply to data brokers 
who compile information for marketing purposes or to determine 
general consumer treatment.163 These companies postulate that their 
data collection is outside the purview of the FCRA because they do 
not necessarily collect data or issue scores in connection with 
lending, insurance, or employment decisions.164 Nonetheless, these 
companies collect information about consumers’ “credit worthiness, 
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, 
personal characteristics, [and] mode of living.”165
That said, the FTC has been investigating privacy issues and 
data collection in broader contexts beyond traditional credit 
reporting. The FTC has authority to regulate data privacy and is 
appropriately concerned with the expansion of data collection.166
Section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)
prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”167 The FTC therefore aims to increase transparency in 
the marketplace in order to protect consumers from deception.168 It 
also targets deceptive practices that place consumers’ privacy at risk 
with respect to not only financial information under the FCRA, but 
also to health information and data regarding children.169
about ARS when it sent me notice of suspected fraudulent use of my credit card. 
After providing proof of identity, ARS sent me their “Consumer Report” on me 
along with statements alerting me of my rights. Letters from ARS to author (letters 
on file with author).
162. See Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 846.
163. See id. at 860.
164. See id. at 858-60.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
166. See Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 877.
167. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
168. Id. § 45(a)(2); see also Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 876-
77.
169. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 131-33, 113 Stat. 
1338, 1382-83 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, § 1306, 112 
Stat. 2681-728, 2681-734 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6505); Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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[T]he FTC conducts its investigations with a focus on reasonableness—a 
company’s data security measures must be reasonable in light of the 
sensitivity and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and 
complexity of its data operations, and the cost of available tools to 
improve security and reduce vulnerabilities.170
In this vein, the FTC has been investigating online privacy 
issues and dangers associated with companies’ collection and use of 
consumers’ data generally without knowledge or approval.171 In 
March 2012, the FTC issued a report setting forth best practices for 
companies to follow in order to better protect consumers’ privacy 
and give them greater control over the collection and use of their 
personal data.172 The lengthy report shed light on companies’
collection of consumers’ information from not only direct
interaction, but also public records and information purchased from 
other companies without consumers’ consent.173 The FTC noted that 
most consumers do not realize which companies have their data or 
what information the companies have, and it is very difficult for 
consumers to access and to verify collected data, even when data 
brokers offer that option.174 It is tough for even the savviest 
consumers to investigate the winding and uncertain trails of data 
sources.175
The FTC report concluded that there is a lack of laws requiring 
data brokers to maintain the privacy of consumer data that falls 
outside of the FCRA’s scope.176 It therefore recommended that 
Congress consider enacting legislation requiring all data brokers to 
protect privacy and ensure data security and breach notification for 
170. Protecting Consumer Information: Can Data Breaches Be Prevented?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) (statement of Edith Ramirez, 
Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission).
171. FTC Issues Final Commission Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy: 
Agency Calls on Companies to Adopt Best Privacy Practices, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Mar. 26, 2012) http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/03/ftc-issues-final-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy.
172. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
173. Id. at 26, 68-69.
174. Id. at 68-69.
175. Id. at 5-43.
176. Id. at 68-70.
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consumers.177 The FTC emphasized that brokers should disclose 
details about their data collection and use of consumers’ information, 
provide access to collected data, and give consumers choice 
regarding data practices that are inconsistent with the context of a 
particular transaction or the business relationship with the 
consumer.178 The FTC further suggested that data brokers should 
establish a centralized website where consumers could get 
information about brokers’ practices and consumer options for 
controlling data use.179 The Commission nonetheless commended the 
progress that had been made regarding Do Not Track, although its
use is limited.180
In the summer of 2012, the FTC also pursued enforcement 
actions regarding data privacy. For example, the FTC fined Spokeo 
$800,000 for marketing a service that provides consumer reports and 
background checks.181 This was the first time the FTC initiated an 
enforcement action related to “the sale of Internet and social media 
data in the employment screening context.”182 According to the FTC, 
Spokeo gathered consumers’ personal information from hundreds of 
online and offline data sources to create and sell consumer profiles 
that included information such as name, address, age range, email 
addresses, “hobbies, ethnicity, religion, participation on social 
networking sites, and photos.”183 Spokeo nonetheless was not 
protecting the information or taking steps to assure its accuracy as 
required under the FCRA.184 This amounted to unfair and deceptive 
acts in commerce.185
In spring of 2013, the FTC issued orders to ten companies after 
conducting a test-shopper operation that indicated that these 
177. Id. at 1-37 (but concluding that such legislation should not apply to 
companies that collect only non-sensitive data from fewer than 5,000 consumers a 
year).
178. Id. at 22-70. The report is very lengthy and contains a broad range of 
principles for protecting consumers’ privacy and access to data collected about 
them. Id.
179. Id. at 69.
180. Id. at 52-53. The FTC also is working with the Department of 
Commerce and stakeholders to develop industry-specific codes of conduct. Id. at 73.
181. Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly 
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA, supra
note 80.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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companies might be violating the FCRA.186 As “part of a worldwide 
privacy protection effort,” FTC test-shoppers posed as parties 
seeking consumer information to make insurance, credit, or 
employment decisions.187 The letters were not official notice by the 
Commission that any of the named companies violated the FCRA, 
but they alerted companies to evaluate their practices to determine 
whether they are consumer reporting agencies, and if so, to comply 
with that law.188
The FTC conducted this operation in conjunction with Global 
Privacy Enforcement Network, which “connects privacy 
enforcement authorities to promote and support cooperation in cross-
border enforcement of laws protecting privacy.”189 Specifically, the 
ten companies flagged for potential violations included:
Two companies that appeared to offer “pre-screened” lists of consumers 
for use in making firm offers of credit: ConsumerBase and 
ResponseMakers;
Two companies that appeared to offer consumer information for use in 
making insurance decisions: Brokers Data and US Data Corporation; and
Six companies that appeared to offer consumer information for 
employment purposes: Crimcheck.com, 4Nannies, U.S. Information 
Search, People Search Now, Case Breakers, and USA People Search.190
These companies raised red flags by indicating willingness to sell 
consumer information without abiding by FCRA requirements such 
as verifying that the potential purchasers of the information planned 
to use the data for legitimate purposes.191
Since that time, the FTC has brought more enforcement actions 
against privacy violators.192 For example, the FTC obtained $3.5 
million, the second-largest penalty in a FCRA matter, against 
186. FTC Warns Data Broker Operations of Possible Privacy Violations,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May 7, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/05/ftc-warns-data-broker-operations-possible-privacy-violations. 
187. Id.
188. See Letter from Maneesha Mithal to 4Nannies, supra note 127, at 1. 
189. See FTC Warns Data Broker Operations of Possible Privacy Violations,
supra note 186.
190. Id. 
191. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(e)(2) (2012).
192. See, e.g., HTC America, Inc., No. C-4406, FTC File No. 122-3049 
(June 25, 2013); Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (July 27, 
2012); Google, Inc., No. C-4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011); Twitter, 
Inc., No. C-4316, FTC File No. 092-3093 (Mar. 2, 2011). 
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Certegy Check Services in August 2013.193 Certegy is one of the 
nation’s largest check-cashing-authorization services that compiles 
people’s personal information and uses it to help retailers decide 
whether to accept a customer’s personal check.194 The company 
allegedly failed to follow proper dispute procedures.195 It also failed 
to institute reasonable procedures for assuring the accuracy of 
information provided to its merchant clients, which included grocery 
stores and other common places where consumers would often suffer 
great detriment from having their checks denied.196 The FTC settled a 
factually similar lawsuit against TeleCheck for $3.5 million in 
January 2014.197
The FTC and its Commissioner have continued to voice 
significant concerns regarding Big Data. Commissioner Julie Brill 
stated in her address, Big Data and Consumer Privacy: Identifying 
Challenges, Finding Solutions, at the Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs at Princeton University on February 
20, 2014:
As we further examine the privacy implications of big data analytics, I
believe one of the most troubling practices that we need to address is the 
collection and use of data—whether generated online or offline—to make 
sensitive predictions about consumers, such as those involving their sexual 
orientation, health conditions, financial condition, and race.198
Commissioner Brill went further to highlight companies’
discriminatory use of data to segment consumers deemed risky or 
lower value,199 making them vulnerable to targeted offers for payday 
and other high-cost fringe lending products.200
193. Certegy Check Services to Pay $3.5 Million for Alleged Violations of 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Furnisher Rule, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 
15, 2013) http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/certegy-check-
services-pay-35-million-alleged-violations-fair.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. TeleCheck to Pay $3.5 Million for Fair Credit Reporting Act Violations,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/01/telecheck-pay-35-million-fair-credit-reporting-act-violations.
198. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Big Data and Consumer 
Privacy: Identifying Challenges, Finding Solutions, Address at the Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University 3 (Feb. 20, 2014), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/202151/
140220princetonbigdata_0.pdf.
199. See id. at 3-5 (noting alarming facts regarding categorizations).
200. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: Considering 
Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65 (2013). 
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Accordingly, the FTC’s statements and recent enforcement 
actions have been influential in shaping companies’ data privacy and 
security practices.201 This essentially has developed a “common law”
for data practices.202 FTC actions and settlements have a ripple effect, 
as they provide standards and best practices for brokers to follow and 
arouse companies’ fear that they will face expensive audits if they 
breach these standards.203
Furthermore, the FTC has an opportunity to play a special role 
in protecting the consumer “have-nots.” It may use its powers to curb 
unfair practices that seek to take advantage of vulnerable 
consumers.204 It has become clear that data privacy abuses and 
improprieties persist, and there is need for legislation or expanded 
regulations to curb data brokers’ improper practices that evade the 
FCRA. Furthermore, the FTC should work in tandem with the CFPB 
in regulating data privacy with respect to financial products and 
services.
B. CFPB
The CFPB created under Dodd–Frank has the power to restrict 
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts” that are “likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which [are] not reasonably avoidable 
by consumers” where this injury “is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”205 Dodd–
Frank defines “abusive” to include contextual consideration of race, 
201. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM L. REV. 583, 585 (2014).
202. See generally id. (arguing that the FTC’s enforcement actions and 
settlements have created a “common law” for privacy regulation, but urging the FTC 
to be bolder in its actions).
203. Id. at 600-56; Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and 
Privacy and Security Duties for the Cloud, 13 Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 577, at 1-4 (Apr. 7, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2424998 (discussing the influences of FTC actions on data practices and 
cases indicating that companies may be held responsible for hiring data service 
providers that do not follow proper privacy and security standards).
204. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 203, at 3-4.
205. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376, 2005-06 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 
(2012)). Dodd–Frank includes payday lending within its references to small-dollar 
lending, and has expressed its concern with payday lending. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS: A WHITE PAPER OF 
INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 1, 4 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf. 
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gender, and other such classifications.206 Dodd–Frank also directs the 
CFPB to research “‘access to fair and affordable credit for 
traditionally underserved communities’” as well as effective 
disclosures to address consumer propensities.207 This has opened the 
door to the CFPB’s possible action in the area of consumer reporting 
and scoring.
Dodd–Frank also allows for double-barrel federal/state 
regulation. The Act mandates that the CFPB must coordinate with 
states in regulating financial products and services, and preserve 
states’ power to provide greater protections than those federal law 
provides.208 This furthers federalism by preserving states’ power to 
enforce their own consumer protection laws for the benefit of their 
citizens.209 Dodd–Frank also empowers state attorneys general to 
enforce the Act’s prohibitions and any rules the CFPB 
promulgates.210 A broad reading of Dodd–Frank also gives state 
attorneys general the power to investigate potential federal 
violations.211
Although the FTC has remained at the helm in regulating credit 
reporting, the CFPB also has been looking at how its regulations 
could extend to consumer reporting on broader levels.212 The CFPB 
may exercise its supervisory power “by requiring the submission of 
reports and conducting examinations to: (1) Assess compliance with 
Federal consumer financial law; (2) obtain information about such 
persons’ activities and compliance systems or procedures; and (3) 
detect and assess risks to consumers and to consumer financial 
markets.”213 The CFPB may therefore review the processes used by 
credit reporting companies in compiling their reports and ensure that 
companies comply with requirements of the FCRA.214 Nonetheless, 
“because the rule itself does not require any entity to alter its 
206. See Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of 
Attorneys General After Dodd–Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 132-54 (2013) (noting 
the ambiguity, but proposing broad reading of the Act).
207. Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 
CHAP. L. REV. 23, 36-38 (2011) (quoting § 1013(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1968).
208. See § 1015, 124 Stat. at 1974; see also Hawkins, supra note 207, at 55.
209. Hawkins, supra note 207, at 54-56.
210. Totten, supra note 206, at 126-34.
211. See id. at 132-54 (noting the ambiguity, but proposing broad reading of 
the Act).
212. See Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77
Fed. Reg. 42,874 (July 20, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 1090). 
213. Id.
214. Id.
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provision of consumer reporting products or services, any estimate of 
the amount of increased compliance would be a prediction of market 
participants’ behavior.”215
Still, the CFPB’s power may extend to data brokers and 
consumer scoring beyond traditional credit reporting.216 In 2012, the 
CFPB promulgated a final rule on “Defining Larger Participants of 
the Consumer Reporting Market.”217 It promulgated this rule in order 
to facilitate “the supervision of nonbank covered persons active in 
that market” for consumer reporting.218 It thus focused its definition 
to covered persons with annual receipts derived from the business of 
consumer reporting in excess of $7 million.219 It also broadly 
construed “‘consumer reporting’” as “‘collecting, analyzing, 
maintaining, or providing consumer report information or other 
account information . . . used or expected to be used in connection 
with any decision [by another person] regarding the offering or 
provision of a consumer financial product or service.’”220
However, the CFPB’s coverage includes large exceptions. It 
does not include the collection of data that relates to a company’s
own transactions or experiences with consumers.221 The CFPB’s 
coverage also excludes transactions between a consumer and an 
affiliate to another person engaged in consumer reporting; “approval 
of a specific extension of credit”; employment decisions;
government licenses; and residential leases.222 These exceptions, 
along with the $7 million threshold, significantly narrow the CFPB’s
regulatory scope.
215. Id. at 42,892. 
216. Id. at 42,898. 
217. See id. at 42,874. The authority to “supervise” nonbank larger 
participants of the consumer reporting market is derived from 12 U.S.C. § 5514. 
Marc S. Roth & Charles Washburn, Data Brokers Face Blurring Lines, Increased 
Regulatory Risks, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/data-brokers-face-
blurring-lines/. 
218. Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 42,874. The final rule explicitly notes that “[i]t does not impose new 
substantive consumer protection requirements. Nor does it delineate the scope for 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act related to 
consumer reporting activities, or any other Federal consumer financial law.” Id. 
(emphasis added).
219. Id. at 42,874, 42,876.
220. Id. at 42,884 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(ix) (2012)). 
221. Id. at 42,885.
222. Id. at 42,885-87.
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Nonetheless, some data brokers that provide consumer scores 
are under the CFPB’s jurisdiction in regulating “larger participants”
in the “consumer reporting” area, thus opening the door to CFPB 
study of consumer scoring.223 Furthermore, the CFPB has authority 
to issue regulations and take enforcement actions with respect to the 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act’s prohibition on financial institutions 
from sharing nonpublic, personally identifiable customer information 
with nonaffiliated third parties without giving customers an 
opportunity to opt out.224 The CFPB’s enforcement authority 
generally is primarily over nondepository institutions and depository 
institutions with over $10 billion in assets.225 Moreover, the FTC 
remains active in policing the data broker industry and pursuing 
legislative reforms targeting consumer scoring.226
C. Federal Discrimination Law
Outright discrimination offends public values as well as the 
United States Constitution. Constitutional equal protection law 
precludes state laws that discriminate against women, minorities, and 
other suspect classifications.227 With respect to financial transactions, 
223. Based on the description of these e-scores in the New York Times
article, see Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers’ Buying Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-
scores-rank-consumers-by-potential-value.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, it appears 
that these scores are calculated and provided to other parties to be used “‘regarding 
the offering or provision of [particular] consumer financial product[s] or 
service[s].’” Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77
Fed. Reg. at 42,884 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(ix)); see also id. at 42,874 n.8
(defining consumer reporting for the purposes of defining larger participants in the 
consumer reporting market); Roth & Washburn, supra note 217 (explaining that 
“[o]nly data brokers with more than $7 million in annual receipts resulting from 
relevant consumer reporting activities would be subject to CFPB supervision”). 
224. M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20185, PRIVACY 
PROTECTION FOR CUSTOMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION 2-3 (2014).
225. Id. at 5. The CFPB’s rules still may apply to smaller depository 
institutions. Id.
226. Roth & Washburn, supra note 217.
227. John A. Ward III, Note, Husband and Wife—Contracts—Married 
Woman Not Liable on Mercantile or Trading Contract Unless Disability of 
Coverture Removed—Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—San Antonio 1956, error ref’d n.r.e.), 34 TEX. L. REV. 1094, 1094-96 (1956) 
(highlighting courts’ applications of covertures statutes directing that a married 
woman cannot enter binding contracts). It was not until 1981, however, that the U.S. 
Supreme Court finally held that laws allowing a husband to sell or encumber marital 
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the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits creditors from 
discriminating against an applicant “with respect to any aspect of a 
credit transaction” on the basis of race, sex, marital status, religion, 
or national origin.228 The ECOA thus precludes lenders from offering 
substantially different interest rates or pricing structures to those in 
protected groups, and from targeting or discouraging applications 
from protected groups.229 Specifically, lenders may not evaluate 
applications on a prohibited basis or discriminate against applicants 
because their income comes from a part-time job, alimony, child 
support, veterans’ assistance, or other public assistance.230 Lenders 
must also notify applicants of adverse actions taken in connection 
with an application for credit in an accurate and timely manner.231
Nonetheless, the ECOA has been criticized as largely 
ineffective in addressing the subtle discrimination that occurs with 
respect to lending and credit scoring.232 The Act essentially addresses 
only blatant disparate treatment or the rare disparate impact cases 
that are sufficiently well documented.233 For example, a plaintiff may 
survive a motion to dismiss where she proves disparate treatment 
based on evidence that a creditor used gender-based epithets in 
threatening to increase the amount owed on a debt.234 The Act also 
may stop a credit-reporting agency from blatantly downgrading 
consumers based on race.235 However, even disparate treatment 
property without a wife’s consent were unconstitutional. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 
450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012).
229. ALYS COHEN ET AL., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION 22-23, 25 (Nat’l 
Consumer Law Ctr., 5th ed. 2009).
230. Id. at 54-55, 144.
231. Id. at 129, 148, 187, 196, 198 (noting that creditors also may not 
consider likelihood to have children).
232. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 173 n.153 (2009) (noting that “‘lenders continue to deny 
loans to creditworthy consumers and practice gender and spousal discrimination’” 
despite passage of the ECOA (quoting Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” 
and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and 
Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and 
State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 585-86 (1996))).
233. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 10, 13-14.
234. Sharp v. Chartwell Fin. Servs. Ltd., No. 99-C-3828, 2000 WL 283095, 
at *1, *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2000) (finding plaintiffs survived the creditor’s motion 
to dismiss on their ECOA and FDCPA claims where they had specific evidence of 
harassing threats with gender-based and racial epithets).
235. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 10.
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claimants face difficulties in finding and obtaining company memos 
or other evidence to prove their allegations.236
Disparate impact cases are particularly difficult to prove.
Claimants bear a tough burden in (1) establishing that the defendant 
employed a specific policy or practice in order to discriminate and 
(2) demonstrating with statistical data that the policy or practice had 
a demonstrable adverse effect on the claimants.237 Furthermore, in 
lending and other consumer contract cases, defendants may easily 
hide misuse of biases or stereotypes in determining rates and prices 
under the guise of “business justifications.”238 “Discretionary
pricing” is so common and accepted in economic and marketing 
236. See COHEN, supra note 229, at 69-71. In addition, women may be able 
to use the FDCPA to recover against debt collectors who harass them with threats 
against their children or negative comments about their marriages and capacity to 
raise children. See Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 866, 868-
69, 874-76 (D.N.D. 1981) (awarding plaintiff damages under the FDCPA where a 
collector told her that she “shouldn’t have children” due to her hospital debt); Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(affirming injunction and fines against a company that told female debtors that their 
children would see them “‘being taken away in handcuffs,’” and “‘be bringing their 
mommy care packages in prison’”); Black v. Aegis Consumer Funding Grp., Inc., 
No. CIV. A. 99-0412-P-S, 2001 WL 228062, at *2-9 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2001) 
(awarding damages under the FDCPA where the collectors told a mother that they 
would take her “‘kids’ clothing,’” and hounded her about whether her marriage was 
the reason she was not paying her debts). 
237. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate 
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257, 297-98 (2011) (stating that it is “very 
rare for plaintiffs [in disparate impact cases] other than highly sophisticated and 
well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail under Title 
VII” in the employment context).
238. Masudi v. Ford Motor Credit Co., No. 07-CV-1082, 2008 WL 2944643, 
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (dismissing an ECOA claim for failure to meet this 
burden of proof, and dismissing the FDCPA claim because the defendant was a 
creditor and not a collector). Borrowers also have launched “reverse redlining” cases 
against lenders that target racial minority communities for overpriced loans, but 
these actions are difficult for plaintiffs and their attorneys to recognize, let alone 
prove and bring to successful fruition. See generally Andrew Lichtenstein, United 
We Stand, Disparate We Fall: Putting Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in 
Touch with Their Class, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1339 (2010) (discussing reverse 
redlining claims); Pouya Bavafa, The Intentional Targeting Test: A Necessary 
Alternative to the Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Analyses in Property 
Rentals Discrimination, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491, 496 (2010) (discussing 
reverse redlining in housing rentals and “substantial difficulty establishing 
discrimination under traditional civil rights jurisprudence”).
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circles that consumers are bound to fail in any attempts to show its 
discriminatory underpinnings and impacts.239
Moreover, the secrecy surrounding the algorithms and 
mathematical formulas used to create credit and consumer scores 
establish further obstacles to proving discrimination claims regarding 
these scores.240 The mathematical models behind the scores are 
“trade secrets,” or proprietary intellectual property, and therefore 
remain a mystery to regulators and the public.241 For example, the 
Fair Isaac Corporation that compiles FICO scores does not publish 
its mathematical formula and consumers have no access to this 
information despite the power that FICO scores have on consumers’
credit access and rates.242
In addition, the algorithms that drive consumer scores and 
segmentations are difficult to regulate because they are subject to 
change as data brokers gather further intelligence and change their 
models based on a broad range of factors and emerging innovations.
Furthermore, subtle discrimination easily persists based on economic 
or historical data, and it is tough to show that the data is the result of 
continuing structural biases.243 Furthermore, economists, 
239. See generally Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary 
Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 375 (2010) (discussing difficulty of proving discrimination in mortgage 
cases and the role of “discretionary pricing”).
240. See generally Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: 
Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841 (1998) (noting how trade secrets law impedes regulation).
241. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. at 5-7 (amended 1985) (setting 
forth the trade secrets law that has been adopted in forty-seven states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
242. See Scores – Scoring and Scoring Solutions, FAIR ISAAC CORP.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20140214065800/http://www.fico.com/en/solutions/sco
res-scoring-and-scoring-services/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). There are also 
numerous blogs and online articles highlighting the secrecy of these scoring models 
as trade secrets. See, e.g., Jason Steele, How FICO Scores Are Calculated (Feb. 24, 
2012), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0212/how-is-fico-calculated.
aspx. 
243. Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 443-
44 (2010) (highlighting persistence of discrimination at the “subtle level” and 
difficulty of proving discrimination claims under Title VII, especially with respect to 
gender); Deval L. Patrick, Robert M. Taylor, III & Sam S.F. Caligiuri, The Role of 
Credit Scoring in Fair Lending Law–Panacea or Placebo?, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING 
L. 369, 386-89 (1999) (noting how the difficulty of proving lending discrimination 
has left it to the U.S. Department of Justice to enforce fair lending laws, and that the 
Department has had to focus most of its limited resources on disparate treatment 
cases with respect to race).
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policymakers, and even the general public, have come to accept price 
segmentation and differentials as reasonable means for companies to 
set prices based on market risk and demand.244
D. State Legislative and Enforcement Action
Many states have versions of the FCRA, and state attorneys
general have asserted their own enforcement actions. However, some 
states have been more proactive in pursuing legislation targeting data 
brokers on broader levels. For example, a bill is under consideration 
in California in response to a court ruling that California’s Song–
Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, which limits the data that 
merchants may retain about credit-card transactions, does not apply 
to online purchases and digital downloads.245 In the case behind the 
court ruling, a consumer sued Apple for requiring personal 
information in violation of the Song–Beverly Act.246 The court found 
that the text of the bill suggested that it applies only to physical 
stores.247
The California bill under consideration thus seeks to extend 
state law limitations on data collection to cover electronic 
purchases.248 The bill essentially replicates the text of the Song–
Beverly Act and adds language to include credit card transactions 
involving digital and downloadable products.249 Accordingly the bill 
makes it illegal to record personal information with respect to 
purchases in-store or online. Merchants may only collect such 
information to the extent necessary for completing a transaction or 
for other permissible purposes such as fraud or identity theft 
prevention.250 Nonetheless, even in these narrow circumstances, 
244. See generally Anja Lambrecht et al., Price Discrimination in Service 
Industries, 23 MARKETING LETTERS 423 (2012).
245. S.B. 383, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); California Senate 
Approves Online Credit Card Privacy Bill, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/california-senate-approves-online-credit-
card-privacy-bill-242841641.html. The Senate passed SB-383 on January 30, 2014, 
and it was ordered to the California General Assembly. It was read, and then 
referred to the Assembly Banking and Finance Committee on April 24, 2014. Cal. 
S.B. 383.
246. Apple Inc. v. Superior Court, 292 P.3d 883, 884 (Cal. 2013); CAL. CIV.
CODE. §§ 1747-1748.95 (West 2009).
247. Id.
248. Cal. S.B. 383.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 3(c)(3)(A).
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companies must destroy collected information as soon as the 
permissible purpose has been met.251 Furthermore, the bill also bars 
companies from aggregating collected information or selling it to 
others.252
Notably, the bill is quite narrow in that it only applies to 
product purchases made “by any means of download to a computer, 
telephone, or other electronic device.”253 This means that the bill 
would not apply with respect to the use of a credit card to get a cash 
advance or make a security or damage deposit. It also would not
apply to data collection related to delivering or installing special 
orders. In addition, online merchants could continue to collect 
consumer data with respect to purchase of downloadable products if 
the consumers opt in to data sharing.254
Opponents of the bill argue that it “places over-reaching 
restrictions on operators of commercial Internet Web sites or Online 
Services.”255 They argue that the bill imposes undue burdens on 
covered merchants by requiring that they notify consumers of the 
purpose of their requests for data and use of the information.256 Some 
merchants also complain that the bill would thwart efficiency by
requiring them to give consumers an opportunity to opt out of data 
collection at the outset of a transaction and again before the 
transaction is final.257 Some critics also argue that the bill hinders 
merchants in seeking to protect consumers from identity theft despite 
its limited allowance for data collection to prevent fraud.258
In addition, the California Chamber of Commerce suggested
that the bill would impose an “enormous burden[] on online retailers 
of digital products because it would require companies to bifurcate 
their digital product offerings into two categories depending on the 
amount of information shared by the consumer.”259 The Chamber 
further argues that the bill unduly hinders merchants’ ability to notify
251. Cal. S.B. 383.
252. Id. 
253. Id. § 2(p) (emphasis omitted).
254. Cal. S.B. 383.
255. S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS: THIRD READING 9 (May 7, 2013), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/sb_383_
cfa_20130528_131545_sen_floor.html.
256. Senate Passes Bill Limiting Fraud Protection Efforts, CAL. CHAMBER 
COM. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/02062014-
senate-passes-bill-limiting-fraud-protection-efforts.aspx.
257. See Cal. S.B. 383 § 3(d)(3)(B). 
258. S. RULES COMM., supra note 255, at 8-9.
259. Senate Passes Bill Limiting Fraud Protection Efforts, supra note 256.
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consumers about software updates and upgraded pricing, and 
presents obstacles to their provision of other online support.260 The 
Chamber adds that the bill will harm California-based Internet 
businesses by inciting class actions and requiring that there be a 
separate system for California consumers.261
In contrast to California, other states’ consumer protection laws 
have been less aggressive in targeting data brokers. For example, 
Colorado’s consumer protection law is narrower in its coverage. It 
prohibits merchants from collecting and retaining a consumer’s
entire credit card number and expiration date after a transaction is 
completed.262 The law also prohibits merchants from recording a 
social security number (SSN) as identification or proof of 
creditworthiness.263 A merchant nonetheless may record a credit card 
number when a check is issued to pay the amount due on that credit 
card, and may record a SSN on a loan application or on a check 
issued to pay a student loan.264
Colorado law also provides additional protections for SSNs 
more generally. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act states that a 
“person or entity” may not publicly post or display an individual’s
SSN, print a SSN on any card required to access products or 
services, or require an individual to transmit his or her SSN over an 
insecure connection on the Internet, unless the SSN is encrypted.265
Furthermore, the law protects individuals from having to use their 
SSN to access an Internet web site without a password or unique 
personal identification number.266 The law also prohibits entities 
from printing a “SSN on any materials that are mailed to the 
individual, unless state or federal law requires . . . or authorizes the 
SSN to be mailed.”267 The law nonetheless allows SSNs to (1) be 
included inside “applications and forms sent by mail”; (2) “establish, 
amend, or terminate an account, contract, or policy”; or (3) “confirm 
260. Id. However, the bill specifically allows for data collection to establish, 
maintain and upgrade consumers’ accounts. Cal. S.B. 383.
261. Senate Passes Bill Limiting Fraud Protection Efforts, supra note 256.
262. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-3-506 (2013) (adding that a merchant may 
record the type of credit card and the issuer of the credit card when a consumer 
displays a credit card as an indication of creditworthiness or identification). 
263. Id. § 4-3-506(a).
264. Id. § 4-3-506(b).
265. Social Security Numbers, COLO. ATT’Y GEN.,
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/initiatives/identity_theft/social_security_nu
mbers (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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the accuracy of the SSN.”268 However, SSNs in these mailings may 
not be printed on a postcard or otherwise visible on or through an 
“envelope or without the envelope having been opened.”269
States also have brought enforcement actions regarding the use 
of data to engage in discriminatory practices to target particular 
groups. For example, in State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., the Iowa 
Attorney General used statistical analysis to show that “Vertrue’s
marketing practices disproportionately affected elderly Iowans” in 
selling memberships in savings programs.270 The state cross-
referenced Vertrue’s marketing information “with motor vehicle 
division, social security, and background investigation databases” to
show how the company’s deceptive marketing practices 
disproportionately impacted older consumers.271 The court thus 
dismissed Vertrue’s arguments that “it did not direct its marketing 
plans at the elderly, and programs were not designed to appeal to a 
specific age group.”272 The court found that even the company’s own 
internal report noted the disproportionately high percentage of 
customers over fifty-five who purchased the deceptive plan at issue, 
and thus “Vertrue, at the very least, should have known that their 
fraudulent strategies disproportionately affected the elderly.”273
Such cases are nonetheless rare. As noted above, it is very 
difficult to prove discriminatory data practices. Data brokers can 
generally “blame” discrepancies on the economics or other 
complexities of the market. Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding 
consumer scores create a nearly insurmountable hurdle for any 
would-be complainants to gather the evidence they would need for a 
successful claim. Still, policymakers are exploring the discrimination 
and data privacy concerns surrounding consumer scores and 
segmentations, and appear poised to propose or promulgate
regulations.
III. ROADMAP TO REGULATIONS
Consumers have become increasingly concerned with their data 
privacy. Companies scoop up surprising amounts of information 
about consumers with little accountability. The Obama
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 834 N.W.2d 12, 18, 44 (Iowa 2013). 
271. Id. at 44.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 45.
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administration has therefore proposed a privacy “bill of rights” to 
increase transparency regarding data brokers’ collection and use of 
consumer data, and give consumers greater control over how 
companies use this personal information.274 Furthermore, the FTC 
has highlighted data privacy and scoring concerns affecting 
consumers, and seeks to explore how Big Data affects low income 
and underserved consumers.275 Indeed, this is an expansive issue. 
Accordingly, although companies and consumers derive benefits
from data collection, its use in assessing secret scores and 
segmenting society creates public and private harms that 
policymakers should address with an aim toward advancing just 
policy.
A. Balancing Benefits and Burdens
Do consumer scores and segmentations merely facilitate benign 
business or foster discriminatory practices that deserve policy 
attention? Information asymmetries are not new in the B2C market.
Consumers usually have less information than merchants regarding 
any given transaction and related privacy practices.276 Indeed, 
consumers generally do not realize that data brokers track their every 
move, let alone that brokers use this data to determine what offers 
and deals consumers receive.277 Data brokers usually do not notify 
consumers that they are gathering the consumers’ data in order to 
assign consumer scores, and brokers certainly do not reveal or 
publicly explain the mathematical formulas or other trade secrets that 
drive these scores.278
Consumers benefit when they blissfully enjoy beneficial deals, 
fraud prevention, and innovative offerings due to the growth and 
depth of Big Data.279 Companies benefit from data brokers’
marketing services and assistance in boosting their bottom lines and 
274. See Alexis, supra note 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. FTC to Examine Effects of Big Data on Low Income and Underserved 
Consumers at September Workshop, supra note 34 (announcing the September 2014 
workshop to explore these issues).
276. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 819-20 (discussing “‘information 
inequality’” among Jeroen van den Hoven’s transparency concerns).
277. Id. at 819 (highlighting a story of a consumer who suffered a credit 
downgrade most likely due to his use of a credit card at Walmart, although that was 
merely an educated guess because the consumer did not have access to specific 
information underlying the downgrade).
278. See id.
279. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 47-48.
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enhancing consumers’ online experiences.280 Companies also should 
have choice in contracting partners. Freedom of contract remains a 
backbone of commercial and contract law. Meanwhile, data brokers 
understandably guard their algorithms and models behind consumer 
scores as their proprietary business assets they have created through 
significant research and development.281
Nonetheless, overreliance on data-based practices and 
assumptions can also harm companies.282 Rigid reliance on data and 
application of analytics may lead to poor marketing, hiring, and 
retention decisions and policies.283 This is because such reliance on 
data ignores the humanity and fluidity of the market.284 Indeed, 
“humans are messy and irrational,” but data-driven determinations
rely on assumptions that overlook this messiness.285 Successful 
company leaders seek “‘the elusive sweet spot between data truth 
and human truth.’”286 They know that people and their interests 
change, and companies must embrace creativity and a growth 
mentality in order to prosper in an evolving market.287
For example, a zip code considered less desirable may quickly 
become a popular area inhabited by plenty of consumers who would 
be lucrative customers. However, companies reliant on consumer 
scores based on old assumptions about that zip code may ignore 
these consumers or offer them lesser deals. Data does not always 
drive the best marketing policies. Open-mindedness is important, and 
“a large measure of beyond-the-numbers insight is required to move 
past the bits and bytes so easily gathered with today’s technology.”288
280. See id. at 47.
281. Id. at 42.
282. See Rich Karlgaard, Forget Piketty—Data Fascism Is the Bigger 
Threat, FORBES (May 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/
richkarlgaard/2014/05/07/forget-piketty-data-fascism-is-the-bigger-threat 
(explaining how overreliance on data analytics can harm companies).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. RICH KARLGAARD, THE SOFT EDGE: WHERE GREAT COMPANIES FIND 
LASTING SUCCESS 13 (2014) (quoting Robert Egger, chief designer of Specialized 
Bicycles). Karlgaard calls this “taste” and explains how this is a pillar of the “soft 
edge” central for companies’ success. Id. at 150-72 (discussing taste). 
287. See id. at 53-72. Basing decisions on assumptions derived from data 
underestimates the changing and often irrational nature of humanity. Id. at 17-18. 
288. Id. at 169. Big Data does greatly benefit businesses by informing them 
of how individuals are using products and how they behave in the marketplace. Id. at 
171. However, algorithms often need tweaking and lazy reliance on historical data 
leads businesses to become stagnant and miss opportunities. Id.
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Furthermore, data-driven scores and segmentation may harm 
consumers.289 Data-based assumptions may exacerbate class 
disparities by favoring the wealthy and sophisticated consumers to 
the disadvantage of the most vulnerable populations.290 Algorithmic 
classifications skew how companies treat consumers and foster 
discrimination when based in part on assumptions related to race, 
gender, ethnicity, zip codes, and other data points that consider 
economic and educational resources.291 These classifications increase 
the gaps between consumer “haves” and “have-nots” by leading 
companies to offer the “haves”—but not the consumer “have-
nots”—the best offers and remedies.292
In addition, as noted above, current discrimination law is 
limited and largely ineffective in preventing or stopping 
discriminatory scoring and classification.293 Reporting law also is 
essentially nonexistent with respect to scores used for marketing, and 
it is very difficult for consumers to learn about, let alone prove, 
discriminatory practices. Claimants face a tough burden in gathering 
data and trying to prove disparate treatment, and usually are unable 
to show disparate impact.294 Moreover, it is especially difficult to 
prove discrimination with respect to consumer scoring due to its 
protection under trade secret law and the multifaceted data behind 
these scores.295
Consumer classifications also may not target minorities per se 
but nonetheless harm consumers under the guise of valid 
289. Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different 
Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 50 (2013). 
290. Id. at 51 (further explaining that “[m]ost of the biggest concerns we 
have about big data—discrimination, profiling, tracking, exclusion—threaten the 
self-determination and personal autonomy of the poor more than any other class”). 
291. See id.
292. Id. at 50-52; see also Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55 (2013) (also noting how Big Data fails to capture the 
preferences and risks for those that do not actively engage with data).
293. Cullerton, supra note 19, at 820-23 (emphasizing how consumer scores 
may amount to discrimination). 
294. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 237, at 297-98 (noting the difficult burden to 
bring a disparate impact case); Plummer v. W. Int’l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 
(9th Cir. 1981) (“A civil rights plaintiff has a difficult burden of proof, and should 
not be deprived of what may be persuasive evidence.” (footnote omitted)).
295. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 13, at 100-18 (noting the secrecy of credit 
scores and dangers of algorithms); Unikel, supra note 240, at 841-90 (discussing 
concerns regarding use of trade secrets law to impede regulation).
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marketing.296 For example, a data broker’s classification of a 
consumer as a “Biker Enthusiast” based on inferences from data 
collected online and offline may benefit the consumer when used by 
a motorcycle dealership for targeted marking.297 However, this 
classification may hurt that consumer when an insurance company 
uses it to infer risky behavior.298 Similarly, a consumer may enjoy 
receiving sugar-free candy coupons due to data suggesting that the 
consumer has a “Diabetes Interest,” but suffer higher insurance rates 
due to that same categorization.299 Worse yet, these consumers 
generally are unaware of these classifications or their impacts and 
have no means for contesting their veracity or precluding their use.300
While some condone this as usual marketing, it fosters 
inequities and hinders consumers’ trust in the marketplace.301 Such 
injustice also may spread in communal ways and violate relational 
norms. Taken to its extreme, scoring based on one’s social 
connections or “friends” on Facebook creates incentive to avoid 
companions and family with less advantageous economic, social, or 
professional profiles. Consumers should not be essentially punished 
based on who their friends are. This seems to offend basic morality 
and asks for consumers to base their social networks on 
creditworthiness instead of kindness, love, and familial ties.302
B. Proposed Reforms
Most policymakers and commentators have focused on need 
for consumer notice that their data is being collected and giving them 
choice regarding such data collection.303 They target data brokers’
practices and urge them to give consumers the power to learn about 
and stop data collectors’ overreaching.304 FTC Commissioner Brill’s
296. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 48-49 (highlighting the pros and cons 
of consumer scoring and classifications).
297. Id. at 49 (providing the example).
298. Id. at 48 (providing the example).
299. Id. (providing the example).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 826-28 (discussing how consumer 
scores may harm relational norms).
303. This may be due in part to the data industry’s indication that it would 
prefer such a self-regulatory regime over more intrusive regulations, such as broad 
bans on data collection. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 590–94 (noting how 
privacy policies emerged).
304. Brill, supra note 198, at 10.
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“Reclaim Your Name” initiative, the proposed Data Broker 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), and the 
most recent FTC proposals reflect this agenda.305
1. Reclaim Your Name
FTC Commissioner Brill has announced a comprehensive 
initiative called “Reclaim Your Name” aimed at enhancing consumer 
choice with respect to data collections.306 As she stated in her 2014 
presentation at Princeton University:
I believe we need to improve our commercial privacy laws in the US. I 
believe Congress should enact three pieces of legislation to help address 
these issues. First, I call on Congress to enact legislation that would 
require data brokers to provide notice, access, and correction rights to 
consumers scaled to the sensitivity and use of the data at issue. Such a law 
should require data brokers to give consumers the ability to access their 
information and correct it when it is used for eligibility determinations, 
and the ability to opt-out of information used for marketing. . . . Second, I 
believe adoption of baseline privacy legislation for the commercial arena 
would close the gaps in consumer privacy protections and help level the 
playing field among businesses. And third, I think it is increasingly clear 
that the United States needs data security legislation.307
As an initial step in the direction of enhanced notice and
choice, this agenda would involve creation of a single portal for 
consumers to gain control over the information collected about 
them.308 The portal would thus “give consumers the power to access 
online and offline data already collected, exercise some choice over 
how their data will be used in the commercial sphere, and correct any 
errors in information being used by those making decisions seriously 
affecting consumers’ lives.”309 The portal also would educate 
consumers about companies’ privacy policies by stating the facts in 
simple and straightforward language instead of the incomprehensible 
legalese that obfuscates most companies’ privacy policies.310 This 
movement has been central in the FTC’s data privacy agenda,311 and 
305. Id. at 9.
306. Id. at 8.
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 9.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Julie Brill, Demanding Transparency from Data Brokers, WASH.
POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-15/opinions/4141
2540_1_data-brokers-fair-credit-reporting-act-data-fuel; Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Reclaim Your Name, Keynote Address at 23rd Computers Freedom 
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Commissioner Brill again voiced support for similar policy 
initiatives in her statement on May 27, 2014.312
2. Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 
(DATA Act)
Similarly, Senators Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) and Ed Markey 
(D-Mass.) introduced the DATA Act to codify many of the same 
data privacy and choice provisions.313 The bill has been assigned to 
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, where it 
remains for consideration before possible presentation to the House 
or Senate as a whole.314 This Act would bar data brokers from 
obtaining or attempting to obtain information that a data broker 
knows or should know to be stolen or false, unless the information is 
collected to identify a discrepancy.315 It also would require that data 
brokers establish procedures to ensure the accuracy of information 
that specifically identifies an individual, unless the information only 
identifies a name or address.316
In addition, the DATA Act would require data brokers to allow 
consumers to review personal information gathered about them at 
least one time per year, free of charge.317 Consumers would then 
have power to dispute the accuracy of the data collected, and the data 
brokers would have to investigate disputes and correct any erroneous 
information.318 The DATA Act also would empower the FTC to 
establish the aforementioned website with information about 
consumers’ privacy rights and how consumers may review personal 
information and object to its use for marketing purposes.319 The FTC 
also would promulgate regulations to implement and enforce the 
DATA Act and ensure that data brokers create measures to audit 
internal or external access to information they collect.320
and Privacy Conference (June 26, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130626computersfreedom.pdf.
312. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C-3–C-8 (providing an additional 
statement of Commissioner Julie Brill with the May report).
313. Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th 
Cong. (2014). 
314. Id.
315. Id. §§ 3(a)-4(b)(1).
316. Id. § 4(a).
317. Id. § 4(c)-(d).
318. Id. § 4(f).
319. Id. § 5(2).
320. Id. § 5.
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A violation of the DATA Act would be a violation of the FTC 
Act.321 Accordingly, the FTC could pursue violators and subject them 
to related penalties. State attorneys general and other state agencies 
also would have power to enjoin further violations, compel 
compliance, obtain damages on behalf of residents of their states,
and obtain civil penalties in an amount no greater than $16,000 per 
violation.322 However, these state actors would have to refrain from 
instituting a civil action during the pendency of any FTC action.323
3. The FTC’s May 2014 Proposal
After the DATA Act’s introduction, the FTC highlighted its 
support for much of the Act’s provisions in its May 2014 data broker 
report.324 The FTC echoed the DATA Act in recommending 
legislation requiring free consumer access to collected information at 
least once per year and means for “opting out” of data collections.325
The FTC also reinforced the DATA Act’s and Commissioner Brill’s
proposed creation of a central website for identification of data
brokers and links to data brokers’ access tools and opt-outs with 
respect to data sharing for marketing purposes.326 The FTC also 
urged establishment of measures for auditing or retracting any 
internal or external access to data containing collected personal 
information.327 The FTC added that the law should require that 
consumers must opt in to allow any data sharing of sensitive
information, such as that related to health issues.328
The FTC’s proposed legislation would nonetheless differ from 
the DATA Act in various ways. For example, the FTC suggested that 
the Internet portal requirements should be limited to the largest fifty
data brokers in order to advance its efficacy and help minimize 
information overload.329 The FTC also proposed that data brokers list 
clients to whom they distribute collected data and disclose inferences 
they derive from such data (such as an inference that a consumer is 
321. Id. § 6(a).
322. Id. § 6(e)(1)-(2). 
323. Id. § 6(e)(3)(C).
324. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49-56 (discussing proposed 
legislation).
325. Id. at 54.
326. Id. at 50. 
327. Id. at 53-54.
328. Id. at 50-54 (adding further detail regarding such proposed legislation). 
329. Id. at 51.
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interested in a certain activity based on Internet search history).330
Additionally, the FTC’s proposed legislation would require data 
brokers to notify consumers when collected data adversely impacts a 
consumer transaction or prevents a consumer from a potential 
benefit.331
The Commission’s recommendations also went further to 
propose privacy by design.332 This would employ logarithms and 
software with privacy features that limit data collection to 
information essential for a particular transaction and preclude data 
collection with respect to youth under eighteen years of age.333 The 
FTC urged that such measures would augment the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act’s (COPPA) protections of children’s privacy 
by extending restrictions to data collected offline.334 In addition, the 
FTC called on data brokers to establish measures for ensuring that 
downstream users of data do not use the data for discriminatory or 
other unlawful eligibility determinations with respect to credit, 
insurance, or employment.335
It is nonetheless unclear how the FTC’s legislation or the 
DATA Act would work, or whether such regulations’ benefits would
outweigh their costs. For example, the FTC’s report noted the 
Commissioners’ disagreement on creation of an opt-out portal due to 
such costs.336 Commissioner Wright voiced concern that the benefits 
to consumers of requiring data brokers to provide them with the 
ability to opt out of data sharing for marketing purposes may not 
outweigh the costs of imposing such restrictions on companies.337
The report further explained that 
although the concept of a centralized portal to provide consumers with 
information about the practices of data brokers may be useful in theory, 
330. Id. at 52.
331. Id. at 53-54. The DATA Act does not require disclosure of inferences 
made from collected data, the names of clients who purchase data, or sources of data 
if the data adversely impacts a consumer transaction or potential benefit. See Data 
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th Cong. (2014). The 
DATA Act does not protect offline data collection from youth under the age of 18, 
as proposed by the FTC’s recommendation. Id. The DATA Act also does not require 
“privacy by design” methods in creating data systems to ensure downstream users 
do not use data for unlawful or discriminatory purposes. Id.
332. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 54.
333. Id. at 55.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 55-56.
336. Id. at 50 n.82.
337. Id. at 51 n.85.
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[Commissioner Wright] believes that the Commission should engage in a 
rigorous study of consumer preferences sufficient to establish that 
consumers would likely benefit from such a portal prior to making such a 
recommendation.338
The FTC’s proposed website portal would be limited to the 
fifty largest data brokers, but delineating that list could be 
problematic.339 Furthermore, the proposal does not clarify the scope 
of data that the regulations would cover, or address consumers’ 
inertia when it comes to their contracts and privacy. Most consumers 
already lack interest in reading their contracts and verifying their 
credit reports. It is therefore unlikely that the majority of consumers 
would invest the time and resources required to review all 
information collected and verify its accuracy. Instead, only the most 
resourceful and sophisticated consumers would take on this task—
possibly increasing the gap between the consumer “haves” and 
“have-nots.”
It is also questionable that creating a system similar to that 
under the FCRA would improve the accuracy of data collections.
With respect to credit reports, policymakers have proposed the Stop 
Errors in Credit Use and Reporting (SECURE) Act to address 
rampant inaccuracies in credit reports and scores by increasing and 
expanding the requirements on credit reporting agencies and data 
furnishers.340 U.S. Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Brian Schatz 
(D-HI) proposed this act in the wake of a Consumers Union report 
indicating that credit report errors affect 40 million Americans and 
can devastate consumers who face significant obstacles in seeking to 
correct these errors.341 Senator Schatz endorsed the act, emphasizing 
that tougher measures are necessary to combat “a dark ecosystem of 
338. Id.
339. Id. at 51 n.86. The FTC suggested that “large data brokers” could be 
defined through rulemaking like the CFPB has done to determine “larger 
participants” subject to its examination authority under 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B). 
Id. However, such rules leave gaps and it seems especially difficult with respect to 
data brokers due to the breadth, depth, and variability that have been hallmarks of 
the Big Data industry. Arguably every company could be considered a data broker in 
some respects. 
340. Sens. Brown and Schatz Announce Legislation Protecting Consumers 
from Inaccurate Credit Reports and Scores, BROWN (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-and-schatz-
announce-legislation-protecting-consumers-from-inaccurate-credit-reports-and-
scores [hereinafter SECURE Act Press Release].
341. Id.
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companies that are not accountable to consumers” despite their 
tremendous power in determining consumers’ credit342
Specifically, the SECURE Act would provide consumers with 
free credit scores and empower the CFPB to develop procedures for 
credit reporting agencies to follow as a means to improve 
accuracy.343 It also would require credit reporting agencies to send 
creditors the materials related to consumer disputes and facilitate 
effective resolution of these disputes.344 Sponsors emphasized that 
this is especially important to address the reported failures in current 
dispute resolution procedures.345 The Act also would empower courts 
to stop a credit reporting agency from reporting inaccurate 
information and provide the FTC with increased authority to bar 
reporting agencies’ poor practices.346
C. Balanced Change
Policymakers, academics, and consumer advocates are 
encouraging the data broker industry to take more aggressive action 
to protect consumer privacy. It is unlikely, however, that companies 
with a monopoly on data collection will take socially optimal action 
on their own.347 Moreover, legislative or regulatory action is 
warranted to address public harms emanating from unchecked 
consumer scoring and segmentation. As the WPF concluded:
Consumer scoring has substantial potential to become a major policy issue 
as scores with unknown factors and unknown uses and unknown validity 
and unknown legal constraints move into broader use. Secrecy, fairness of 
the factors, accuracy of the models, and the use of sensitive information 
are some of the key issues that must be addressed. It is exquisitely unlikely 
that self-regulation will solve all of the dilemmas consumer scoring 
introduces.348
342. Id.
343. SECURE Act, S. 2224, 113th Cong. § 3(e)-(f) (2014); SECURE Act 
Press Release, supra note 340.
344. SECURE Act Press Release, supra note 340.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Daniel P. O’Brien & Doug Smith, Privacy in Online Markets: A 
Welfare Analysis of Demand Rotations 36-38 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Econ., 
Working Paper No. 323, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/privacy-online-markets-welfare-analysis-demand-rotations/
wp323.pdf (assessing the transactional costs associated with data privacy practices 
and protections, and arguing that effective competition is one tool that would assist 
socially beneficial privacy choices).
348. DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 84.
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Therefore, the time is ripe to craft regulations that are workable
and efficient, but sufficiently robust to address scoring’s and 
segmentation’s perpetuation of unfair assumptions and ultimately 
discrimination. This should begin with cost-effective notice and 
choice regulations backed by enforcement and dispute resolution 
mechanisms that prompt data brokers to honor consumers’ privacy 
preferences. It also should include strong auditing procedures that 
hold data brokers accountable for discriminatory or otherwise 
improper use of consumers’ data.
1. Notice and Choice
Currently, companies often include their privacy policies in the 
fine print of their contracts, but such weak disclosure is largely 
meaningless because consumers rarely read these contracts or launch 
successful privacy claims based on contract or tort law.349
Furthermore, some companies do not even have privacy policies.350
The FTC has had to rely mainly on creation of “soft law” through 
reports, workshops, guidelines, and settlement decrees with respect 
to the enforcement actions it has pursued.351
Accordingly, creation of a notice and choice portal like that 
proposed by the DATA Act and the FTC’s report is a step in the 
right direction toward advancing more meaningful transparency.
This also would comport with most commentators’ and courts’
support for disclosure laws that protect freedom of contract while 
making consumers responsible for reading contracts and making 
appropriate choices.352 It is thus no surprise that regulators advocate 
for greater disclosure regarding consumers’ data profiles.353 This type 
of notice and choice also helps to balance the power in B2C 
transactions and interactions.
Nonetheless, such notice and choice is not sufficient to address 
discriminatory effects of consumer classifications and segmentations
349. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 591-96. The article emphasizes 
that ‘“broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract 
claims’” and that tort claims similarly have failed. Id. (quoting Dyer v. Nw. Airlines 
Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004)).
350. See id. at 588.
351. Id. at 625-27 (explaining the creation of soft law that is not enforceable 
per se but persuasive through various means short of specific rulemaking).
352. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending 
Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 105 (2011).
353. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not 
Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2013). 
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produced by big data analysis.354 Instead, giving individuals notice 
and choice may simply perpetuate the growing gap between 
consumer “haves” and “have-nots” because the least sophisticated 
consumers remain least likely to protect themselves.355 As noted 
above, consumers already lack the education, resources, and time 
required to read the usually long and laborious fine print of their 
contracts, thus making it difficult to imagine that they would have 
the wherewithal to access many companies’ privacy policies and opt 
out.356
Information overload also may drive even the sophisticated 
consumers who comprehend privacy policy terms to nonetheless take 
no action to protect their privacy. An opt-out portal with overly 
abundant disclosures and options would overwhelm consumers, 
leading them to make no choices due to confusion, exhaustion, and 
lack of patience. Consumers also are apt to be overly optimistic and 
assume that companies will interact with them in a fair manner.357
They also may assume that they would be sufficiently savvy to detect 
and deal with any unsavory or problematic contract terms.358
Furthermore, data devices like cookies could render an opt-out 
portal ineffective.359 For example, the researchers from Berkeley 
noted above argue that any opt-out rules must be accompanied by 
restrictions on companies’ use of cookies that reinstate themselves 
after deletion as means for circumventing consumers’ data choices.360
They further suggest that companies should disclose how they 
enhance the information a consumer provides with information 
purchased or secured by outside trackers.361
354. Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 353, at 36.
355. See id. at 36-38. Big Data is essentially a “sociotechnical system” that 
should be regulated with balanced regulations crafted by policymakers, lawyers, 
technologists, and other stakeholders with a focus “on the risks of segmentation 
inherent in classification.” Id. at 38-39.
356. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine 
Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1751-70 (2014); see also Skelton v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing a statute’s drafters’ concern 
that “consumer product warranties often were too complex to be understood”).
357. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 356, at 1771.
358. See id. at 1771-74. See generally Schmitz, supra note 18 (further 
discussing psychology of consumer contracting).
359. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text (discussing robust 
cookies, third-party collections, and other technologies that threaten one’s ability to 
protect herself online).
360. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 291-95.
361. Id. at 295.
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As noted above, an Internet portal for disclosure and opting out 
of data collection also raises additional practicality and cost issues.
What data falls within the scope of this requirement, considering 
how broad “marketing” may be construed? How much will the 
system cost for regulators and companies seeking to comply? Who 
will monitor the system, and where will the funding come from?362
Again, will these costs and burdens outweigh any benefits of the 
system, considering that most consumers already lack time, 
resources, and patience to check their credit reports under the 
FCRA? Similar concerns underlie Commissioner Wright’s noted 
objections to the FTC’s proposed legislation.363
That said, increased transparency and access to collected 
information would help promote brokers’ compliance with 
regulations and best practices. Many consumers would use the portal
if it is easily accessible, understandable, and reasonably limited in 
scope. Accordingly, the portal could be limited more strictly than the 
FTC has proposed to include only the largest twenty or twenty-five
data brokers. The portal should be sure to cover and highlight those 
data brokers who generate consumer scores or segmentations,
especially those that factor in race, gender, income, and the like. In 
addition, industry fees or a tax on revenues from selling consumer 
data could cover the costs of the portal.
A limited portal would be more cost-effective and help protect 
the smaller businesses with lower revenues from data collections.364
A more limited portal also would help minimize information 
overload, especially if portal designers are vigilant to provide a user-
friendly interface for consumers. Additionally, it would be more
manageable for regulators to monitor a more streamlined and simple 
portal. Again, the aim should be to provide a user-friendly notice and 
choice mechanism that provides the greatest “bang for the buck” in 
protecting consumers and alerting regulators of possibly 
discriminatory use of data.
362. The FTC’s staff and funding are quite limited. See Solove & Hartzog, 
supra note 201, at 599-607 (noting that there were only forty-five staff in the FTC’s 
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection in 2010).
363. See supra notes 329-39 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC’s 
proposal and Commissioner Wright’s concerns regarding this requirement).
364. Please note, nonetheless, that determining a “revenue” threshold is very 
difficult to begin with, and especially problematic with respect to data brokers with 
limited assets and ability to orchestrate accountings to bypass revenue limits. 
Moreover, these are merely initial ideas and further research and system design 
should follow. This Article seeks to merely open the discussion and inspire ideas.
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2. Enforceability Measures
Furthermore, any portal of this kind should be backed by a 
dispute resolution process and measures for enforcing resolutions 
and consumer choices. Contract claims based on choices under 
privacy policies are generally futile.365 It is usually not worth it for 
consumers to bring contract claims in light of litigation costs.366
Furthermore, it is difficult to prove causation or the amount of 
damages with respect to data breaches or data inaccuracies.367 That is 
especially true with respect to the emotional repercussions that often 
accompany a data breach.
Accordingly, any central data privacy portal should give 
consumers not only the ability to opt out of data sharing and access 
to the information collected about them, but also the power to hold 
the brokers accountable. This could be done efficiently through a 
complaint or online dispute resolution (ODR) system that ensures 
enforcement of opt-out choices and correction of proven data 
inaccuracies. As noted above, the SECURE Act has been proposed 
in part to address rampant errors in credit reports that go uncorrected 
due to lack of an effective dispute resolution system.368 The same 
problems would likely plague any system with respect to data 
collections that is set up without a clear remedy system.
ODR systems are growing in popularity and offer cost-effective 
resolution of consumer disputes worldwide.369 An ODR system could 
be linked with the central opt-out and disclosure portal. Through this 
link, consumers could efficiently pursue brokers who do not respect 
their data collection choices or correct data inaccuracies. This would 
allow consumers to use an online stepped process to obtain timely 
remedies. This could walk the parties through (1) negotiation; (2) 
mediation; and (3) arbitration as needed to ensure a speedy and final 
resolution based on the supporting documentation.
365. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 595-97.
366. See id.
367. Id. (noting failures of contract law to address data privacy issues, and 
using the failed contract claim of airline passengers who claimed misuse of their 
information after the September 11th attacks due to inability to prove damages).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 340-46 (discussing SECURE).
369. Amy J. Schmitz, Introducing the “New Handshake” to Expand 
Remedies and Revive Responsibility in eCommerce, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014); Schmitz, supra note 18, at 319-31. See generally Amy J. 
Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers 
Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178 (2010) (discussing the promise of 
and suggesting best practices for ODR).
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Such an ODR system would differ from a general complaint 
process by bringing in a neutral third party to facilitate settlement 
pursuant to online mediation. It also would engage a third-party 
neutral to determine the merits of the complaint if the dispute is not 
settled by mutual agreement through negotiation or mediation.
Furthermore, data brokers who do not follow timelines and 
procedures for investigating data breach claims, ceasing data 
collections, or correcting errors in accordance with the system, could 
be fined and/or subject to enforcement action. Additionally, the ODR 
mechanism would allow the FTC and other regulators to easily 
monitor data brokers’ compliance while also providing consumers 
with enforced resolutions of their data disputes.370
This ODR system also could build from a complaint process 
like that employed by the CFPB with respect to financial products 
and service disputes.371 The CFPB’s complaint process has been 
effective in shedding light on improper credit card practices and has 
assisted the CFPB in focusing its enforcement efforts on companies 
with poor complaint records and industries fraught with consumer 
protection violations.372 The complaint database also is publicly 
available, which allows consumers to investigate companies’ track 
records and assists industries in learning what matters to 
consumers.373
However, such complaint processes still do not ensure that 
companies will reply to complaints or provide any redress.374 Unlike 
the ODR process suggested above, general complaint processes do 
not culminate in a third-party determination on the merits if the 
parties fail to reach a mutual resolution.375 Furthermore, general 
370. Again, these are merely initial ideas. Further development and 
discussion is essential.
371. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A SNAPSHOT 
OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED JULY 21, 2011 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2014 (2014) 
[hereinafter CFPB REPORT], available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407
_cfpb_report_consumer-complaint-snapshot.pdf (analyzing consumer complaints 
filed according to different categories).
372. Id.
373. Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: 
An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 343, 345-58 (2014) (discussing the purpose and process of the database).
374. Id. at 350-67 (noting untimely or inadequate responses to consumer 
complaints in particular industries).
375. Id.; CFPB REPORT, supra note 371. The CFPB has proposed adding 
consumer narratives to the complaint database to increase transparency. Disclosure 
of Consumer Complaint Narrative Data, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,765 (proposed July 23, 
2014). They are testing the ability to scrub personal information from the narratives, 
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complaint processes do little to prevent companies from ignoring 
claims, as they have done with respect to claims asserted with the 
CFPB by minorities, elderly, and other vulnerable populations.376
This again augments power imbalances and allows for businesses to 
discriminate in terms of the remedies and support they provide to 
different consumers. Accordingly, any complaint process must 
incorporate robust dispute resolution procedures and enforcement 
measures.
Of course, these are merely initial ideas for a cost-effective and 
beneficial enforcement system to support an opt-out portal, and 
further development is essential. Data brokers will likely resist such 
transparency and responsibility regulations, especially those that add 
to their costs. It is also unlikely that they will welcome rules that 
increase their vulnerability to FTC action. Nonetheless, some data 
brokers may embrace such regulations as means for weeding out 
those brokers that harm the industry’s goodwill. Furthermore, the 
benefits of ODR would outweigh its costs, which could be spread 
among data brokers. Moreover, an ODR system that is free for all 
consumers would allow vulnerable consumers to obtain remedies 
and address problematic use of their data.
3. Audits and Accountability Rules
Opt-out and data-dispute measures that empower consumers to 
make enforceable choices and data corrections are an initial step in 
the right direction. Consumers should take responsibility in 
protecting themselves, and a central portal could (1) raise awareness 
about data collection and (2) increase brokers’ accountability.
However, such measures do not go far enough in addressing 
discriminatory effects of consumer scores and segmentation. Those 
with the least education and resources are still least likely to access 
and benefit from any central portal, even if it is more limited. 
Accordingly, any legislation or regulations should include 
auditing and accountability measures that aim to stop and prevent 
improper and discriminatory use of data. This could begin with 
measures like those in DATA Act and the FTC’s proposal that 
require brokers to establish procedures to ensure accuracy of data 
and must consider the risk of re-identification of consumers. Id. at 42,767. It is also 
questionable whether adding this information would lead to information overload.
376. Ayres, Lingwall & Steinway, supra note 373, at 363-67 (finding in their 
study of the CFPB’s complaint process that African-Americans and Hispanics faced 
untimely company responses, along with the elderly).
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collection and legitimacy of data usage.377 As the FTC has suggested, 
legislation also could promote “privacy by design” aimed to limit 
data collections to necessary information related to particular 
transactions and to protect vulnerable individuals such as youth 
under eighteen years of age.378
In addition, the FTC’s proposed default rules precluding data 
sharing with respect to sensitive information could be coupled with 
additional duties to protect vulnerable consumers in traditionally 
disadvantaged groups.379 Brokers also should be required to establish 
auditing and compliance measures aimed to catch discriminatory use 
of consumer information for consumer classifications and scoring.380
Commissioner Brill noted need for stiffer legislation to address 
discriminatory use of data in her May 27, 2014 statement.381 As she 
and the FTC have suggested, these measures could begin with 
requiring data brokers’ due diligence in preventing discriminatory 
use of data they share and sell.382
As noted, some have suggested that the FCRA and ECOA 
should be extended to target discrimination regarding not only credit, 
employment, and insurance determinations, but also broader use of 
collected data.383 However, these acts have not done enough to 
combat arbitrary assessments and disparate impacts of credit 
scoring.384 Thus stronger auditing and enforcement measures are 
necessary for use of data for credit, as well as marketing 
determinations.385
377. See supra Subsections III.B.2-3 (discussing DATA ACT and the FTC’s 
proposal).
378. See supra Subsection III.B.3 (discussing the FTC’s proposal).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 324-28.
380. See Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 353, at 35-36.
381. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C-1, C-5, C-7 (providing an 
additional statement of Commissioner Julie Brill with the report).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.; see also Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting 
Innovation While Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society,
89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1418-24 (2014) (responding to Professor Zarsky’s critique 
of their Scored Society article and highlighting the dangers of scoring in light of the 
volume, velocity, and variety of information that can affect one’s score).
385. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 33, at 6-20 (exploring the opacity of 
credit scores and lack of meaningful insight over the credit reporting process, and 
proposing auditing trails and interactive modeling aimed to assist consumers in 
making decisions based on how it may impact their credit scores); Cullerton, supra
note 19, at 820-24 (highlighting continued discriminatory use of data).
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Accordingly, mandatory—and not merely suggested best 
practices—should require data brokers to conduct due diligence 
before selling or sharing consumer scores to ensure the accuracy of 
the information collected and assess whether would-be data 
purchasers use data classifications in a discriminatory manner.386
Such rules also should require companies that buy consumer scores 
and segmentations to reasonably investigate the creation and 
accuracy of what they buy.387 These companies should then be 
required to file simple reports regarding their use of data through an 
efficient online process.
This would place more responsibility on companies with 
respect to their direct and ongoing interactions with one another, 
instead of relying on consumers’ pro-action. It thus would protect 
consumers’ reasonable expectations without requiring that 
consumers vigilantly police onerous privacy policies.388 Furthermore, 
it would remind data brokers on a periodic basis to check their own 
systems for improprieties. This could benefit companies by 
preventing them from facing expensive regulatory enforcement 
actions and consumer complaints or class actions that also harm their 
goodwill.389
Auditing procedures also could help regulators ensure the 
legitimacy of the automated decision-making systems that underlie 
consumer scoring and segmentations. Automated data collection and 
decision-making systems take human decision-making out of the 
process and are becoming the “primary decision makers” in B2C 
dealings without adherence to due process standards.390 For example, 
automated systems have resulted in the unfair termination of 
individuals’ Medicaid benefits, food stamps, and other welfare 
386. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C-5, C-7 (providing an 
additional statement of Commissioner Julie Brill with the report).
387. See id.
388. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 627-76 (emphasizing need to 
protect consumers’ expectations and how the FTC is already moving in that 
direction with its enforcement actions). It is simply unreasonable to expect 
consumers to access, understand, and act based on privacy policies—which 
companies may or may not employ.
389. Id. at 613. Again, it is true that reporting and auditing measures do 
increase costs for companies, perhaps requiring that they hire compliance officers. 
However, these costs could be minimized through simple online forms and awaken 
businesses’ awareness of data breaches of improprieties—perhaps due to particular 
employees’ poor practices.
390. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1252-53 (2008).
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benefits.391 As another example, “Colorado’s public benefits 
[automated] system . . . denied Medicaid to patients with breast and 
cervical cancer based on income and asset limits that were not 
authorized by federal or state law.”392 The opacity of automated 
systems behind consumer scoring and segmentations may thus 
deprive individuals’ rights and property without appeal to human 
fairness.393
Of course, human decision-making also can harm consumers 
due to individuals’ conscious and subconscious biases that affect 
their determinations. Still, regulations should subject automated 
consumer assessment systems to audits to help correct errors in the 
systems and prevent improper use of biases and assumptions from 
infecting their operations.394 For example, regulators should audit 
systems that crunch collected data to determine classifications such 
as “Urban Scramble” or “Mobile Mixers” (noted earlier with respect
to the FTC’s study of Big Data).395 Such determinations are based on 
not only collected data, but also questionable assumptions (i.e.,
inferring that a certain zip code connotes lower income or racial 
status).396
Understandably, such reporting and auditing requirements raise 
cost concerns. However, the costs of such compliance measures are 
not much more than those companies already may absorb under the 
391. Id. at 1256-57. Automated processes ease public and private costs, but 
they also thwart policy when programmers translate complex data into code using 
“[c]omputer languages [that] may be unable to capture the nuances of a particular 
policy.” Id. at 1257-65.
392. Id. at 1268-72 (noting individuals’ reluctance to challenge automated 
systems due to “‘automation bias’”).
393. For example, digital analytics and processes have resulted in 
termination of Medicaid benefits, garnishment of wages, and placement on “No-Fly” 
lists. Id. at 1273-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
394. See id. at 1301-13.
395. See supra text accompanying note 6 (discussing the FTC’s finding 
regarding these suspect segmentations of Latinos and African-Americans built on 
collected data and inferences); Citron, supra note 390, at 1275-310 (discussing due 
process concerns regarding automated decision making).
396. One commentator has advocated for audits of automated decision 
making by public agencies (i.e., determination of government benefits) as means for 
addressing over-reliance on automated processes and encouraging critical 
assessment of computer’s specific findings. Citron, supra note 390, at 1275-311. 
Private decision-making should not be subject to the same scrutiny as public 
determinations, but may nonetheless be open to regulations when possibly based on 
bias and unverified assumptions.
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FTC’s consent order process.397 The FTC’s consent orders often 
impose reporting and auditing requirements on data brokers, and 
require companies to notify “the FTC of any material changes in 
their organization[s] that [may] affect compliance.”398 Orders also 
may impose fines, independent audits, consumer notification and 
remediation, and establishment of data-integrity or security 
programs.399 Legislative or regulatory auditing and reporting 
measures would merely broaden these duties beyond the relatively 
few brokers that are “caught” through enforcement actions.400
Furthermore, any financial costs are justified in light of social 
costs of discriminatory practices and brokers’ profits from using 
consumers’ data.401 In addition, system expenses could be minimized 
through use of a simple online reporting portal and forms that focus 
on gathering what information and assumptions go into creating 
consumer scores and segmentations.402 Regulators also could limit 
their resources to auditing brokers who create or use the most 
problematic scores and segmentations, and adding minimal random 
audits in order to incentivize companies’ compliance.403
Reporting and auditing need not be draconian or overly 
intrusive. Companies should continue to use models that benefit 
consumers by allowing companies to offer goods and services 
tailored to consumers’ wants and needs. However, outdated and 
shortsighted assumptions based on gender, zip codes, race, and other 
such labels are unwarranted. Furthermore, consumers should not be 
397. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 613-19 (highlighting how the 
FTC’s consent order process “commonly [involves] reporting, audit, and compliance 
requirements for up to twenty years”).
398. Id. at 618-19.
399. Id. at 614-19 (noting additional consent order measures).
400. The FTC currently must generally rely on a showing of a specific 
breach of a company’s stated privacy practices or violation of the FCRA or ECOA 
for grounds to bring actions. Furthermore, the FTC does not have sufficient 
personnel or resources to bring all the necessary enforcement actions. Id. at 609, 
613. Accordingly, stronger proactive measures are necessary.
401. It is difficult to see how any legitimate economic benefits to the data 
brokers outweigh the social and communal harms posed by discriminatory use of 
data.
402. Companies will resist disclosure of rubrics or algorithms that are 
protected as proprietary information. It will be a challenge to determine when such 
protection is proper and if there are instances where public values call for overriding 
such protections.
403. This incentive is similar to that with tax auditing by the IRS. Consumers 
rationally realize that the IRS does not have resources to audit everyone, but the fear 
of an audit incentivizes most consumers to comply with tax reporting rules.
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rated based on their social connections or familial relations.
Companies have access to a vast amount of information that is far 
more useful in making predictions than such simple assumptions, 
which are often faulty at best.
Admittedly, it will be very difficult to draw lines. For example, 
zip codes are sometimes indicative of spending capacity. It is 
nonetheless more accurate to consider consumers’ specific buying 
histories with a healthy realization that consumers living in a lower-
income zip code may have more spending capacity because they are 
not dumping all of their resources into their homes or apartments.
Moreover, zip codes today often include a variety of individuals with 
a range of incomes and spending behaviors.
In sum, institution of auditing and reporting procedures is 
necessary to protect consumers’ expectations instead of merely 
relying on industry self-regulation.404 As other commentators have 
suggested, the FTC should consider consumer context and varied 
experiences, and push for bolder data protections that go beyond 
companies’ chosen privacy policies.405 Moreover, it is essential for 
regulators to curb the discriminatory use of data that has hidden 
under the guise of consumer scoring and segmentation.
CONCLUSION
Data brokers track consumers’ information and behavior on-
and offline, and use this collected data to create consumer 
segmentations and scores. Companies then secretly use these 
consumer valuations to determine how they will treat different 
individuals. Such secret use of consumer data raises significant 
social and privacy policy concerns within the larger debate about Big 
Data regulation and how best to protect consumers without overly 
burdening brokers or restricting data innovations. Indeed, the FTC is
studying the data broker industry and has advocated, along with 
other policymakers, for legislation that requires data brokers to 
provide greater notice regarding privacy policies and means for 
opting out of data collection.
While such proposals are a step in the right direction, they do 
not go far enough in addressing the impact of consumer scoring and 
segmentation, especially with respect to low-income and other 
404. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 625-76.
405. Id. at 666-76.
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vulnerable consumers. Accordingly, enforcement mechanisms such 
as ODR systems should support any notice and choice portal for data 
privacy. Furthermore, strong auditing and reporting requirements 
should place the burden on data brokers to take reasonable steps to 
stop and prevent discriminatory use of collected data. The social 
harms created by scores and classifications that employ 
discriminatory assumptions outweigh any economic or marketing 
benefits they arguably provide. This Article thus invites balanced 
legislation aimed toward protecting consumer “have-nots” in the 
wake of the Big Data revolution.

